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Fear of the real or perceived consequences of receiving a bid protest exists. U.S. Navy 
contracting officers have some concern of protests. This concern can be linked to certain 
consequences on acquisition strategies. There is enough qualitative and quantitative 
empirical evidence to suggest that fear of protest can impact what would otherwise be 
prudent business decisions. The greatest concerns are a few instances of inappropriate 
uses of lowest price technically acceptable and the reduced technical evaluation 
effectiveness attributed to fear of protests. If fear waters down the source selection 
hindering its ability to distinguish between the true value of offers, then contracting 
officers must ask themselves why go through the trouble of a best-value source selection? 
Could contracting officers simply award to the low bidder? To what extent is the set of 
stringent source selection rules driving the acquisition team to this result by default (i.e., 
regardless of source selection method actually employed)? Thus, for the sake of stringent, 
fairness-based rules, contracted outcomes can be compromised. Whether the tradeoff is 
prudent remains to be determined. Further research is needed to ascertain these other 
culprits, then compare the relative effects of fear of protest among other factors.  
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“Men go to far greater lengths to avoid what they fear than to obtain what they 
desire.” 
―Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code 
A. BACKGROUND  
The U.S. government is the “world’s largest buyer of products and services,” according 
to the Small Business Administration (SBA) (2012, p. 2). From pens and pencils to the joint 
strike fighter and littoral combat ship (LCS), over $500 billion in goods and services has been 
purchased annually since fiscal year (FY) 2007. However, starting in FY2008, year-over-year 
contract spending has been declining because of fiscal constraints. Early estimates by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) project FY2013 spending to be approximately $460 
billion, which is down from $513 billion spent in FY2012.  
In an environment of fiscal prudence, acquisition professionals are charged with the 
proper stewardship of taxpayer funds. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) charges the 
members of the acquisition team with exercising “personal initiative and sound business 
judgment in providing the best value product or service to meet the customer’s needs” (FAR 
1.102(d)). The FAR also states, “An essential consideration in every aspect of the system is 
maintaining the public’s trust. Not only must the system have integrity, but the actions of each 
member of the team must reflect integrity, fairness, and openness” (FAR 1.102-2(c) (1)). One 
mechanism that is installed in the system to ensure integrity and fairness is the protest system. 
Protests ensure “that entities doing business with the government can air their complaints 
about governmental contracting processes and obtain relief” (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011, p. 3). 
Without a forum for businesses to air these complaints, they could become unwilling to do 
business with the government. Protests also address the FAR requirements of integrity, fairness, 
and openness by providing for the “accountability of procurement officials and government 
agencies by highlighting and correcting mistakes and misconduct” (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011, p. 
3).  
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According to FAR 33.101, a protest is “a written objection by an interested party” 
concerning  
 A solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a contract for the 
procurement of property or services.  
 The cancellation of the solicitation or other request.  
 An award or proposed award of the contract.  
  A termination or cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written objection 
contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is based in whole or in 
part on improprieties concerning the award of the contract. 
Only “interested parties” can file a protest. FAR 33.101 defines an interested party as “an 
actual or prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a 
contract or by the failure to award a contract.” Interested parties can file the protest at any one of 
the following venues: the agency, Government Accountability Office (GAO), or the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims. 
Agency protests must be received either before “bid opening or the closing date for 
receipt of proposals” for issues with the solicitation (FAR 33.103(e)). Unsuccessful offerors have 
10 days to file a protest after the impropriety is known, or they have five days after an 
unsuccessful offeror debrief is conducted. Alternative dispute resolution should be attempted 
prior to the protest filing. Agencies should make their best effort to resolve these protests within 
35 days (FAR 33.101(g)).  
Protests to the GAO comprise the majority of all protests filed. The same time line for 
submission of agency protests applies to protests to the GAO. The protestor must provide a copy 
to “the official and location designated in the solicitation or, in the absence of such a designation, 
to the contracting officer, so it is received no later than 1 day after the protest is filed with the 
GAO” (FAR 33.104 (a)(1)). The contracting officer must immediately suspend performance on 
the contract in dispute if already awarded or terminate the contract. If the contract has not been 
awarded, the contracting officer should notify those offerors in the competitive range (FAR 
33.104 (b)(3)).  
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An overall summary of protest decisions from the GAO can be found in Table 1. For 
FY2013, Congress added the requirement for the GAO to include “a summary of the most 
prevalent grounds for sustaining protests” (GAO, 2014). During 2013, the most prevalent 
reasons for sustainment were 
 failure to follow the solicitation evaluation criteria,  
 inadequate documentation of the record, 
 unequal treatment of offerors, and 
 unreasonable price or cost evaluation (GAO, 2014). 
Table 1.   Bid Protest Statistics for Fiscal Years 2009–2013 (from GAO, 
2014, p. 4) 
 
 
This was the first time since FY2009 that protests did not increase year over year, but 
these numbers can be misleading. When measured against the number of contract actions 
awarded, the number of protests represents less than one percent. However, the percentage went 
up slightly for FY2013. In FY2011 and FY2012, protests represented .014 percent of contracting 
actions awarded across the federal government. In FY2013, that number rose to .018 percent of 
federal actions. So, while the overall number of protests filed declined by two percent, the 
number of contract actions also declined by 23 percent. According to these numbers, the protest 
situation got slightly worse.  
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No agency can prevent a protest, but a well-prepared plan can minimize potential grounds 
for protest (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 427). As the GAO has identified, there are numerous reasons 
why an interested party might choose to file a protest: 
A number of analysts have suggested that companies are increasingly likely to file 
protests when it is in their business interest to do so, even when they do not 
believe there was an error in the procurement process. When agencies do not 
adequately debrief losing bidders, the losing companies may file a protest to 
determine why they lost the competition. Other reasons companies may protest, 
include hoping to influence the outcome of future competitions (akin to “yelling 
at the referee”); proving to shareholders and executive managers that they are 
doing everything they can to win contracts; or even seeking to hurt the 
competition by delaying a contract award. (Schwartz et al., 2013, p. 12)  
Even though the GAO’s sustainment rate is minute when compared to the number of 
procurements awarded throughout the federal government, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
acquisition workforce thinks that it is crucial to avoid protests (Gordon, 2011). An agency’s best 
policy to prevent a protest is to mitigate the causes of the protest. This desire to avoid a protest is 
the driving force behind acquisition decisions, internal and external policies, and resources 
needed to deliberately or subconsciously remove the threat of a protest. Throughout the 
remainder of this study, the desire or priority to avoid bid protests is referred to as the fear of 
protests. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND GAP IN LITERATURE  
According to three Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports (Manuel & Schwartz, 
2011; Schwartz, Manuel, & Martinez, 2013; O’Rourke, 2014), Gordon’s publication (2013), and 
other publications (Knauth, 2013; Maser et al., 2010; Kendall, 2012), the fear of protests exist. 
Fear exists because no agency can prevent a protest, and protests may result in the following:  
 issuing a stop work order to suspend performance, 
 reevaluating proposals, 
 awarding proposal preparation and protest filing cost to the successful protester, 
or 
 terminating the awarded contract and re-soliciting the requirement (Rumbaugh, 
2010, p. 415). 
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These protest results add costs, deplete resources, and create other intangible effects (e.g., 
a diminished reputation) to an agency. Based on the protest results, protests could be considered 
a problem to an agency or procurement, even though protests are an avenue in ensuring fairness, 
transparency, and accountability in the federal acquisition system. To mitigate the concern of 
protest, agencies change their acquisition strategies and outcomes. There is no data that exist to 
show the true monetary and nonmonetary effects of such mitigation as a result of fear. 
Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(AT&L), spoke at a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conference in 
Washington, DC. The moderator asked Mr. Kendall,  
My question—my concern goes to things that I heard when I was in the White 
House, but also what I heard as part of my participation on the procurement round 
table, and that’s the fear in the acquisition work force on the part of our 
contracting officers, contract specialists and what that fear is driving them to. 
(Kendall, 2012)  
In response, Kendall acknowledged that fear exists within the DOD: 
The fear of protest does exist out there. It kind of permeates through the system. 
You know, I think at the end of the day we should not be paranoid—or paralyzed, 
is probably a better word—by fear of protest or by fear of litigation. (Kendall, 
2012)  
Kendall, who is the head contracting official for the DOD, alluded to paralysis by the fear of 
protest. Evidence is presented in this thesis that shows the causes and effects of this paralysis.  
There is evidence that Navy acquisition professionals and senior leaders were fearful of a 
protest for the Navy’s LCS. According to the Congressional Research Service report, it was 
insinuated that the desire to avoid a protest situation affected key decisions:  
What role, if any, did a desire by the Navy to avoid a potential contract protest 
against the Navy’s down select decision play in the Navy’s decision to propose 
the alternate dual-award strategy? For example, how concerned, if at all, was the 
Navy that the announcement of an LCS down select decision might lead to a 
contract protest and controversy somewhat like what has been experienced in the 




A December 13, 2010, press report on the LCS program stated, “One high-level Navy 
source recently said that without the dual-ship approach, ‘there is 100 percent chance of a 
protest’” (Cavas, 2010). As a result of this fear, the Navy changed its acquisition plan from a 
down select to a dual-award strategy. 
While scholars and the GAO have identified these deleterious effects of bid protests on 
the government (Gordon, 2013), no research or studies to date have quantified them. In other 
words, we do not know the magnitude of fear of protests. More specifically, we do not know the 
following: the extent that fear of a protest affects acquisition strategies, the monetary and non-
monetary costs of a bid protest, and the lengths that DOD acquisition professionals would go to 
avoid a protest. According to Gordon, in turn, the overwhelming culture among DOD contracting 
officers is to avoid protests to the maximum extent possible. Contributing to the level of fear is 
the fact that protests often impose litigation costs, termination costs, transaction costs, and 
opportunity costs on the government; add to the workload of a shrinking acquisition workforce; 
delay the time of contractor performance and delivery; and bring shame to the source selection 
team (SST). Even when a bid protest is denied, it usually holds up the protested acquisition 
(Gordon, 2013).  
Gordon went on to talk about the effects of protest fear: “Another concern about the cost 
of the protest system relates to what might be called its indirect impact. Fear of protests is often 
given as the explanation for contracting officers’ preference for certain courses of action over 
others” (Gordon, 2013, p. 36). According to one GAO report, protest fear can negatively 
influence agency behavior.  
Fear of protest may motivate agency officials to conduct more rigorous market 
research, hold a competition instead of awarding a sole-source contract, or 
conduct more thorough and fair competition. On the other hand, fear of a protest 
could also prompt officials to try to structure a contract in a manner they deem 
less likely to be protested, such as using lowest price technically acceptable award 
criteria instead of a best-value competition. (Schwartz et al., 2013, p.12)  
When acquisition professionals structure a solicitation using lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA) source selection methodology instead of using trade-offs, they could be 
hurting the industry and the customer. “The president of a major satellite services provider said 
the U.S. military’s ‘lowest price, technically acceptable’ procurement strategy is stifling 
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innovation and ultimately shortchanging war fighters” (Magnuson, 2014, p. 1). This comment 
suggests that one unintended consequence of bid protest is an inappropriate acquisition strategy, 
namely the source selection method. However, no quantifiable data exists that explores the 
relationship between the fear of protest and the appropriateness of the acquisition strategy. 
This research will address the causes and deleterious effects of protest fear, and examine 
the effects of fear on the acquisition system. The research will analyze the data to determine 
whether there are any significant correlations between the cause and effects of fear, and we 
attempt to quantify the magnitude of fear within the U.S. Navy. It will then analyze the data to 
present ways in which acquisition leaders across the DOD can mitigate this fear. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The objective of this research is to address in depth the true causes and effects of bid 
protest fear. Specifically, we explore the following research questions:  
 Are contracting officers sufficiently concerned about bid protests to alter 
acquisition strategies? 
 If so, what factors affect protest fear?  
 What are the consequences to the acquisition strategy and contract outcomes? 
D. METHODOLOGY  
 Because of the nature of the research questions, it is appropriate to use a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Literature from several governmental, public, and 
private studies and reports are used to develop the conceptual model, hypotheses, interview 
questionnaire, and survey. The existing literature is used to identify problems that have not been 
addressed—namely the magnitude, antecedents to, and consequences of a fear of protest. The 
existing literature left an opportunity for further research into an area that would be considered 
beneficial to the acquisition professionals across the federal government.  
To ensure that this research explored the most likely and predominant cause and effect 
variables of a fear of protest, several interviews were conducted at two major Navy contracting 
activities. The goals of the interviews were to validate the conceptual model, identify potentially 
key omitted variables, and validate the measures of variables for which there existed no 
measurement scales.  
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A survey was deployed online to a population of U.S. Navy contracting officers and 
specialists. The data was then used to perform multiple regression analysis of causal 
relationships per the conceptual model.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
This study is broken up into several chapters. Chapter II is the literature review. This 
chapter will discuss and provide an overview of several applicable theories. In Chapter III 
discusses the methodology used, which includes the research and survey designs, interviews, and 
construct measurements. The data results, exploratory factor analysis, and data regression models 
are discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, the findings will present answers to the research questions, 
and offer managerial implications and recommendations in Chapter V.  
F. SCOPE  
Due to time, resources, and administrative constraints, this research was limited to U.S. 
Navy personnel. Furthermore, this research focused on both military and civilian contracting 
officers who make up the Navy’s acquisition workforce within the United States and overseas 
locations. This research represents a wide variety of goods and services procured using FAR Part 
15 source selection methods above $150,000, a wide variety of supported units’ mission, and a 
range of contracting commands within the U.S. Navy. We only analyzed formal contracting 
practices in accordance with FAR Part 15; contract action awards pursuant to FAR Parts 13 and 
8 were not considered since the probability of receiving a protest of simplified and delivery/task 
orders is lower. Under FAR Part 8, protests are lower because the government is using 
mandatory sources for products and services. Under FAR Part 13,  
Unless the contract action requires synopsis pursuant to 5.101 and an exception 
under 5.202 is not applicable, consider solicitation of at least three sources to 
promote competition to the maximum extent practicable. Whenever practicable, 
request quotations or offers from two sources not included in the previous 
solicitation. (FAR 13.104)  
Under FAR Part 15, there is a greater chance for protest because of the effects of best 
value (LPTA and trade-off) under full and open competition.  
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G. MANAGERIAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
A study that explores the causes and effects of the fear of protest is beneficial to DOD 
and federal government acquisition practitioners. First, if the fear of a bid protest is significant, 
source selections may result in the selection of a sub-optimal contractor, thereby compromising 
performance and buyer satisfaction. Alternatively, agencies may award excessive contracts to 
avoid protests. This increases transaction costs and contradicts strategic sourcing goals. It can 
also unnecessarily increase contractors’ bid and proposal costs as they compete for individual 
task orders under multiple-award contracts (e.g., indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity [IDIQ]). 
Additionally, such fear may also lead SSTs to substantially increase transaction costs as extra 
measures are taken to avoid bid protests. These extra measures also delay receipt of contractor 
performance, thereby impeding the mission.  
Second, the acquisition community can use the results of this study to become aware of 
the effects of such fear and its implications. With this awareness, the acquisition community can 
decide where in the acquisition process to allocate additional resources to reduce fear of protest 
and the subsequent consequences. This strategy allows the acquisition community to be 
proactive instead of reactive in dealing with fear and its consequences.  
Third, acquisition leaders and planners within the community can use the information to 
quantify and assess the amount of man hours, money, and people (i.e., resources) that are being 
consumed because of protest fear. With this information, acquisition leaders and planners can 
better align their internal/external policies, acquisition strategies, and resources to mitigate the 
causes and effects driving the fear of protest, which ultimately can save money. In addition, 
acquisition professionals can understand and quantify the resources spent on source selections. 
With the understanding of the amount of human capital, time, and resources, the agency can 
determine which internal/external policies and acquisition strategies are not cost effective. 
Lastly, the amount of human capital, time, and resources spent on bid protest mitigation is an 
opportunity cost of human capital, time, and resources that could have been devoted to other 
critical areas. This is critical for leaders, because as the DOD budget gets smaller, human capital, 
time, and resources will become very precious commodities that agencies cannot afford to waste 
or allocate to inopportune activities.  
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Finally, this study recommends additional research into the fear of protest across different 
government agencies. Each agency has different acquisition workforce compositions, cultures, 
acquisition policies and strategies; the U.S. Navy’s perspective can only be used as a point of 
reference. This does not reflect the true level of fear, causes, and effects across the federal 
government. But this study can be used as a starting point for further research.  
H. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, this study examines the fear of a bid protest—a phenomenon purportedly 
having a significant effect on acquisition decisions. This chapter discusses the problem 
statements and literature gaps along with the methodology that describes the approach to 
collecting data to answer the research questions. The following chapter discusses applicable 
theories along with the research hypotheses and the conceptual model.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Public Value Framework (PVF; Moore, 2000) and stakeholder theories can be 
applied to the fear of bid protests from an economic and managerial perspective. This chapter 
provides further explanation of the study’s conceptual model, research objectives, variables, and 
hypotheses. A visual representation of the model and a summary of the hypotheses are provided 
at the end of the chapter. 
B. BID PROTESTS  
There are numerous reasons why an interested party might file a bid protest. According to 
a 2013 CRS report,  
According to analysts, the most common government errors cited in protests are 
poorly written or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or 
criteria laid out in the request for proposals, and failure to adequately document 
their findings. Some analysts have attributed these errors to an inexperienced or 
insufficiently trained acquisition workforce. (Schwartz et al., 2013, p. 11)  
Although there are many causes for protest, the most typical include 
 improper agency evaluations, 
 a lack of meaningful discussions, 
 defective solicitations, 
 improper exclusion from the competitive range, 
 a lack of cost realism, and 
 agency bias or bad faith (Rumbaugh, 2010). 
A particular business could file a protest whether the protest is frivolous or not.  
The threat of a protest can influence agency acquisition behaviors. Instead of having full 
and open competition, end user customers and acquisition professionals could structure a sole 
source contract. Instead of awarding a single contract (as originally intended per the acquisition 
strategy), multiple award contracts are sometimes awarded in order to avoid a protest. In 
instances where a trade-off source selection methodology is more appropriate in order to attain 
the best value to the government, an LPTA methodology is sometimes used. Instead of limiting 
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proposals in the competitive range, non-qualifying or non-competitive proposals are retained. 
Instead of conducting discussions, agencies may award without discussions.  
Protests come with monetary and non-monetary costs. An agency must incur costs to 
prevent a potential bid protest (e.g., thoroughly documenting and substantiating proposal 
evaluations and trade-off decisions), to defend against an actual protest, and to take corrective 
actions. The end users bear costs as well, since their requirements are delayed or jeopardized. For 
example, building, fielding, and sustaining two varieties of LCS platforms are substantially more 
costly than doing so for one variety. All parties involved in a bid protest incur the opportunity 
costs of their best choice. For example, an agency allocating time and people to prevent a protest 
diverts time and people from other critical requirements. The time and peoples’ salaries or wages 
are the opportunity cost for the critical requirements. 
C. PUBLIC VALUE FRAMEWORK 
PVF was introduced by Harvard professor Mark H. Moore and has been used to evaluate 
and identify value in, mainly, the public sector. Value in the public sector is much different than 
it is in the private sector. Often in the private sector, industry uses shareholder value as a means 
of evaluating itself. The private sector, however, is much different. PVF has been utilized to “get 
public managers thinking about what is most valuable in the service that they run and to consider 
how effective management can make the service the best that it can be” (Coats & Passmore, 
2008, p. 4).  
PVF for application in the government sector can be explained by the strategic triangle 
(Heymann, 1987; Moore, 1995). These three elements are public value, legitimacy support, and 
operational capability. In contrast to private sector operations, the government’s strategy does 
not revolve around a specific bottom line, such as shareholder wealth. Contracting professionals 
are often satisfying multiple entities, such as regulatory requirements (e.g., the FAR), internal 
customers, the private sector, and stewardship of taxpayer resources. According to Moore, the 
first element, value,  
directs managerial attention to the value proposition that guides the organization. 
For an enterprise to succeed in producing value, the leaders of the enterprise have 
to have a story, or an account, of what value or purposes that the organization is  
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pursuing. They need a reason for the organization’s existence, a claim about the 
way in which the world would be made better through the operations of the 
enterprise. (Moore, 2000, p. 197–198)  
In essence, value in a governmental organization equates to mission.  
Moore stated that legitimacy and support  
directs managerial attention to the question of where the support for pursuing the 
value will come from. It is not enough that an entrepreneurial leader judges some 
purposes to be valuable. Others, who provide the necessary financial resources 
and authorization, have to agree with that judgment. In government, those others 
include citizens, elected representatives, interest groups, and the media, which has 
been called the ‘authorizing environment’ of the organization (Heymann, 1987; 
Moore, 1995). (Moore, 2000, p. 198) 
With regard to the fear of protest, there may be an element of shame if a source selection is 
protested, particularly if there is a notion that management would not support the contracting 
officers and that the protest may reflect poorly on them. High dollar contracts, in particular, hold 
great interest to our media and our elected officials. A protest would reflect negatively on the 
contracting official as well as the contracting office. With these concerns in the back of a 
contracting officer’s mind, there can be a tendency to take measures in order to avoid a protest 
that can sub-optimally contribute to a source selection. For example, the officer may rely too 
heavily on LPTA rather than utilizing a best value approach. Fear of a protest is understandable. 
Time has to be devoted to address the requirements of a protest. Ultimately, contracting offices 
then have less time and resources to devote to other requirements. The needs of the customer do 
not stop because of a protest. This, in turn, has an adverse effect on contracting officer’s 
legitimacy and decreases the value of the contracting element.  
Finally, operational capacity focuses attention on the question of whether 
sufficient know-how and capability exist to achieve the desired results. Often, this 
capability lies entirely in the organization that the manager leads. However, 
sometimes it lies outside the organization’s boundary, and the organization has to 
find ways to engage capacities beyond its own to achieve the desired result by 
creating partnerships of various kinds. (Moore, 2000, p. 198)  
Experience and workload levels can often be elements that contribute to the concern of a protest. 
If contracting officers have adequate experience, their likelihood to be affected by this fear can 
diminish. They have seen many source selections and know how to ensure they have a contract 
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file that will stand the test of a protest. Conversely, those with lesser experience and a fear of 
protest from a legitimacy and support perspective may take additional steps to avoid a protest 
and, in turn, reduce the value of the organization by sub-optimally organizing the contracting 
strategy. In contracting there are often very busy times, most notably at the end of the fiscal year 
(EOFY). As the organization may be optimally manned for most of the year, it is likely they are 
not for the EOFY. During this time, requirements are coming in at a much faster rate and with 
less time to produce results. Also during this time, operational capacity can become hindered and 
lead to an increased fear of protest. 
Contracting professionals add value to the country because they address the operational 
needs of our military and, at the same time, provide fairness and address the various public 
policy issues that are required by law and regulation. When these align, customers receive what 
they require at a fair and reasonable price, and this satisfies the requirements of governing 
policies. Through this, government contracting professionals add value to their stakeholders. 
Contracting officers sometimes take steps throughout the acquisition process to avoid a protest, 
such as minimizing discussions or even employing an LPTA source selection process when a full 
trade-off method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013, pp. 36–37). When this occurs, our 
contracting system is not optimizing its value. When it treats a source selection with a fear of 
protest, the agency’s value can be reduced. 
Contracting officers are also accountable to provide fairness to commercial entities with 
which they contract for goods and services (FAR Part 1). Often, though, a fear of a bid protest 
will result in multiple award contracts including more contractors than would have been awarded 
if there was no fear of a bid protest. In multiple award contracts there is a minimum dollar value 
that a contractor is obligated to receive. This results in increased spending of taxpayer money 
that could have been more efficiently spent by awarding to fewer, more competitive contractors. 
This creates extra work for the contracting officer, duplicates inventory, can increase 
transportation costs, and results in non-optimal use of taxpayer money, and often upset 
contractors who never get an award under a multiple award contract for which they believed they 




and there is ultimately less value added by the contracting process. What this does not 
accomplish is a best option for the customer or the taxpayer, nor does it provide fairness to the 
stronger contractors.  
D. STAKEHOLDER THEORY  
The stakeholder theory explains the people and entities’ interest in a particular 
organization. A stakeholder in an organization is, by definition, any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objective (Freeman, 1984). 
According to a stakeholder model of a corporation (Freeman, 2001), stakeholders for a firm are 
owners, suppliers, management, employees, customers, and the local community. For this 
research, the focus is on the contracting offices as the employees and the end-users as the 
customers. Contractors are the suppliers providing a service and/or a product, and the acquisition 
leaders, senior contracting officers, staff, and supervisors are the management. Other 
stakeholders in this research are congress, legal representation of the contracting office, and 
taxpayers/citizens. For the employees (contracting officers), their stake in the firm (contracting 
activity) could be job security, high wages, and job satisfaction. In return, employees are 
expected to follow the instructions of management most of the time (Freeman, 2001). This 
presents an issue if fear of a protest exists at a higher principal level. Employees are expected to 
change their original acquisition strategy to continue to be stakeholders.  
Suppliers (contractors) are vital to the success of the firm. In turn, the firm is a customer 
of the supplier (Freeman, 2001). For the contracting activity, the relationship with the contractor 
is vital. The contractor is a supplier of proposals, market research information, innovation, and 
competition. What happens when a supplier threatens the contracting activity with a protest or 
there is a fear of protest from a supplier? The employees, management, and customers might 
change their original acquisition strategy to keep the supplier as a stakeholder.  
Customers provide the lifeblood of the firm (Freeman, 2001). Without customers, the 
firm would not exist. All organizations realize and understand this. Many organizations treat the 
customers as the principal and themselves as an agent in the principal-agent theory. To continue 
to get revenue and/or business, the agent aligns or focuses the organization’s actions on the 
customer’s needs. The agent needs the customer as a stakeholder to continue to exist.  
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Management (acquisition leaders, senior contracting officers, and contracting staff and 
supervisors) plays an integral role. Managers are the only group of stakeholders who enter into a 
contractual relationship with all other stakeholders. Managers are also the only group of 
stakeholders with direct control over the decision-making apparatus of the firm. Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon managers to make strategic decisions and allocate resources in the manner most 
consistent with the claims of the other stakeholders groups (Hill & Jones, 1992). Management 
must keep the relationships among stakeholders in balance. When these relationships become 
imbalanced, the survival of the firm is in jeopardy (Freeman, 2001). These imbalanced 
relationships among stakeholders and the threat of a protest could be a factor of fear. For 
example, a supplier (contractor) protests an award because the contracting activity did not 
maintain a good stakeholder relationship with the supplier. Since there were no discussions or 
meaningful debriefings, the supplier may protest just to get information. Management must 
devote people (employees), time, and resources to deal with the supplier’s protest while still 
meeting the customer’s needs. Management (agent) must satisfy the customer and the supplier 
base, take care of its employees, and be good stewards of the taxpayers’ (principal) money.  
Legal in many contracting activities is part of the management team. Its role is to advise 
the employees (contracting officers) and the management team of the legal aspect of acquisition 
procurement. Legal looks at the procurement from a different prospective to ensure there are no 
grounds for a protest from prejudice, errors in the procurement process, violations of statutes or 
regulations, and other protestable actions. As a stakeholder, legal offers advice in regard to the 
source selection method. Based on our interviews, legal has influence in the source selection 
method.  
Besides the employees, suppliers, customers, and management, there are other 
stakeholders that are an integral part of the contracting process. They are not involved in the day-
to-day operation of the acquisition process.  
Congress is an important stakeholder in the acquisition process. Congress exerts authority 
over the contracting process through the use of its constitutional powers (Cibinic, Nash, & 
Yukins, 2011, p. 38). The primary means of exercising its authority are through the enactment of 
laws establishing new programs and the appropriation of funds to pay for these programs 
(Cibinic et al., 2011, p. 39). The U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, states that “no 
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money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.” 
Congress also exercises control and oversight over acquisition activities through requirements 
and limitations included in procurement statutes, authorizations acts, appropriations acts, and 
other statutes (Cibinic et al., 2011, p. 39). As a stakeholder, Congress authorizes several 
administrative or judicial forums to hear protests (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011, p. 3). Those 
reasons are to “ensure that entities doing business with the government can air their complaints 
about governmental contracting processes and obtain relief” and “enhance the accountability of 
procurement officials and government agencies by highlighting and correcting mistakes and 
misconduct” (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011, p. 3). 
Without a protest forum, other stakeholders (i.e., suppliers and customers) would be less 
willing to do business with the government, thus decreasing completion, which could potentially 
drive up the cost of products and services (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011, p. 3). 
Taxpayers/citizens represent a wide range of individuals. They can be considered as 
suppliers of funds through government taxation. As part of the general public, taxpayers can also 
be considered customers in that their tax dollars are spent on public goods and services. For 
example, taxpayers pay taxes to fund the military. The military protects and defends the general 
public in the event of an invasion. Taxpayers are employees, management, suppliers, Congress, 
legal, stakeholders and so forth in the acquisition process. As taxpayers in the acquisition 
process, stakeholders have a vested interest to see that their precious funds were not wasted, the 
procurement was awarded through the best source selection method for that particular 
procurement, and the acquisition process was fair to the public. This presents a challenge when 
different stakeholders have different views about which source selection method should be used. 
This research examines the stakeholder theory costs and associated problems that arise 
from a fear of protest. Employees and management are primarily concerned about a protest from 
the supplier. All three stakeholders are trying to meet the interest of the customer.  
E. HYPOTHESES AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
1. Factors Affecting Protest Fear  
There are numerous factors that affect a fear of protest. This study primarily focuses on 
three main factors contributing to the research hypotheses: literature reviews, theory, and logic.  
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a. Insufficient Procurement Administrative Lead-Time Planned 
Insufficient procurement administrative lead-time (PALT) is the inadequate time allotted 
to accomplish an acquisition. Insufficient PALT is often the result of fiscal appropriation 
constraints that commonly occur toward the end of the fiscal year. Expedited requirements and 
poor planning are also common reasons that can lead to insufficient PALT. When sufficient lead-
time is not allocated to properly define requirements, evaluation criteria, and instructions to 
offerors; train the technical evaluators; evaluate proposals; document evaluations and trade-offs; 
and prepare for and brief decision makers, protestable errors are more likely to occur. Thus, 
sufficient time renders the acquisition team capable of successfully performing a source 
selection. Absent sufficient time, operational capability is constrained.  
Hypothesis 1: Insufficient PALT has a direct positive relationship on the level of fear of 
protest. 
b. Contracting Officer’s Competence 
Competence is the contracting officer’s contracting experience, educational background, 
and the professional Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification 
level the contracting officer holds. There is no substitute for experience and for the level of 
confidence one has in his or her ability as a contracting officer. The more experience a 
contracting officer has, the less concern of a protest there should be since the officer has more 
experience in techniques and practices to prevent bid protest. The contracting officer also has 
more knowledge of how to defend a protest if received, and thus, may worry about protests less 
because of the officer’s increased operational capacity to handle a protest.   
Hypothesis 2: The greater a contracting officer’s competence level, the lower the level of 
fear of protest.  
c. Requirement Criticality/Importance 
How critical or important the requirement is to the overall mission of the customer will 
impact protest concerns. If the requirement is critical to the customer’s mission effectiveness, 
there could be a tendency to use a procurement method that does not delay or jeopardize the 
award of the contract. This is because the value of a government agency (e.g., military unit) is  
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determined by its mission effectiveness (Moore, 2000). If the delivery or performance of a good 
or service is delayed, the unit’s mission will likely be delayed to some extent, compromising the 
unit’s public value.  
Hypothesis 3: The level of requirement criticality/importance has a positive impact on the 
level of fear of protest.  
d. Protest Risk 
Risk is defined as the product of the magnitude of consequences and the probability of 
their occurrence. The risks involved with a protest can be added time to complete the acquisition, 
delays to the mission, which can directly and negatively impact the war fighter, additional effort 
and resources required to resolve the protest, and personal shame and embarrassment 
experienced by the acquisition team. Protest may also be perceived as bringing negative career 
repercussions, such as preventing promotion or a direct admonishment. The likelihood of any of 
these negative consequences depends on the circumstances unique to each bid protest. 
Nonetheless, if the protest risks are high, the consequences could jeopardize the unit’s public 
value (e.g., its mission effectiveness).  
Hypothesis 4: As protest risk increases, the level of fear of protest increases. 
2. Protest Fear and the Consequences to the Acquisition Strategy 
Fear is a natural reaction to a threat. As a natural reaction, fear enables humans to remove 
the threat deliberately or subconsciously. In this case, fear of protest could be considered a 
natural reaction to the potential consequences if a bid protest was received. Acquisition 
professionals could deliberately or subconsciously remove the threat through their many 
acquisition strategy decisions. These decisions could be considered actions taken to prevent a 
protest. 
There are numerous consequences to the acquisition strategy and contract outcomes as a 
result of fear. This study focuses on consequences identified from our literature review and 
interviews with subject matter experts and practitioners.  
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a. Quality of Technical Evaluation Effectiveness 
According to FAR 15.304(b), evaluation factors and significant sub factors must (1) 
represent the key areas of importance and emphasis to be considered in the source selection 
decision; and (2) support meaningful comparison and discrimination between and among 
competing proposals.  
Agencies evaluate the competitive proposals and assess their relative qualities based only 
on the factors and subfactors specified in the request for proposal (RFP) (Rumbaugh, 2010). 
As part of the evaluation, proposals are put in a competitive range. The contracting 
officer determines which proposals are within the competitive range based on the evaluated price 
and other evaluation factors included in the RFP (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 338). A low-rated 
proposal could potentially be eliminated from the completive range if the proposal does not meet 
the specified evaluation factors or subfactors in the RFP. 
If the contracting officer and the source selection authority are concerned with a fear of 
protest, they could lower the evaluation factors and subfactors for all of the proposals. By 
lowering the factors, the lower-rated proposals are not eliminated from the competition, which 
mitigates the chances of a protest. The lower-rated proposal might be the winning proposal.  
Hypothesis 5: The level of fear of protest has a negative effect on the technical evaluation 
effectiveness. 
b. Source Selection Method Fit/Appropriateness  
According to FAR 15.101-1, a trade-off process is appropriate when it may be in the best 
interest of the government to consider an award to a company other than the lowest priced 
offeror or other than the highest technically rated offeror. This process gives the source selection 
official very broad discretion when the offeror with the lowest cost to the government has not 
been evaluated based on the non-cost factors (Cibinic et al., 2011, p. 678). 
According to FAR 15.101-2, the LPTA source selection process is appropriate when best 
value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest 
evaluated price. There are many reasons why a contracting officer might opt for the LPTA. One 
major benefit of this strategy is that the agency can greatly shorten the evaluation process 
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because once the low price proposal has been found to be technically acceptable; there is no need 
to evaluate the acceptability of any other proposals. (Cibinic et al., 2011, p. 680).  
The source selection appropriateness depends on the procurement requirement. 
According to one interviewee,  
Again, because my philosophy has always been what is the best way to make sure 
the customer gets what they want. Is it going to be something that either yes, they 
can offer or provide the product or service; yes or no, so it is a slam dunk. Low 
price, technically acceptable—or do you want to have the flexibility of best value 
where it is something that you want to encourage innovation or design or 
whatever else?  
According to FAR Part 6.3, there are many reasons to use a method other than full and 
open competition. Based on the situation, a contracting officer might use any of those reasons 
with a valid justification and approval. If a contracting officer is concerned about a protest, he or 
she could structure, with justification, the requirement for a sole source acquisition. Having an 
approved justification restricts competition to a sole source. This prevents other companies from 
protesting. The use of sole source works well in situations where there is an emergency, the 
mission is in jeopardy, and/or time is very critical.  
A contracting officer may not offer discussions because having communications could 
potentially cause a protest. One of the reasons businesses file protests is because agencies do not 
adequately debrief losing companies. Those losing companies may file a protest just to get 
information on why they lost the competition (Schwartz et al., 2013). 
A contracting officer could also be afraid to talk to businesses. Every word the 
contracting officer says could potentially be used in the protest case. During a CSIS conference 
with Kendall, the moderator described this as “the fear of conducting discussions because 
contracting officers get it into their head that if they conduct discussions, they’re going to end up 
with a bid protest, and it’s just going to take too long, and they’ll get dinged” (Kendall, 2012). 
According to Rumbaugh, if the agency has already received good proposals, then going 
into discussions is not likely to provide more value. It’s “not a good practice to conduct 
discussions to lower offerors’ prices when initial offers are fair and reasonable” (Rumbaugh, 
2010, p. 326). 
22 
Hypothesis 6: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the 
Source Selection method fit/ appropriateness. 
c. Contractor Performance 
According to Gansler, Lucyshyn, and Arendt (2009), competition is important for the 
DOD because it can aid in increasing economic efficiency, innovation, quality, and performance. 
Competition can aid in economic efficiency (for both systems and services) by forcing firms to 
keep prices as low as possible in hopes of winning a contract. Likewise, increased innovation 
results from competitive pressures as firms seek new solutions to DOD problems through 
research and development while trying to differentiate themselves from competitors. 
Competition also impacts quality as firms attempt to improve the quality of a product over time, 
which has the potential to drive lower-quality firms out of the market altogether. Finally, 
competition can also directly impact performance improvements for both weapons systems and 
services. (Gansler et al., 2009, p. 14) 
The use of LPTA only requires the lowest price among offerors that meet the acceptable 
technical requirements. In some instances the quality of technical evaluations are degraded 
because of the check in the box mentality that the LPTA approach brings. Contractors have no 
incentive to improve on quality, economic efficiency, innovation, and performance. As a result, 
LPTA contracts might result in lower standards and performance. According to an article in 
National Defense Magazine, “He [president of a satellite company] pointed to one study by the 
research firm Market Connections in October that said LPTA contracts may result in standards 
and performance being lowered, and less than optimal prices for product development” 
(Magnuson, 2014). These lower standards and performance cost the government in schedule 
delays, cost overruns, poor contractor performance, rework, and ultimately unsatisfied 
customers. In cases where the requirement requires innovation or complex, and/or risk-taking 
requirements on both the government and contractor, LPTA might not be the appropriate best 
value method. For those requirements, the government is looking for the best overall proposal 
value. If LPTA was used for those innovations or complex or risky requirements, the contractor 
could be unable to complete the task because it truly did not understand the requirement reflected 
in the lowest price and minimum acceptable technical approach. The government could have to 
terminate the contract for default and then re-solicit and re-compete the requirement, which cost 
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funds and resources. According to Lohfeld, “When the government applies the strategy [LTPA] 
to unsuitable procurements, both the government and the bidders lose” (2012 p. 1). 
The use of sole source versus competition does not incentivize the contractor to improve 
on quality, economic efficiency, innovation and performance. Sole source procurements create a 
monopoly. The monopoly can set its prices to yield the maximum profit. The monopoly has no 
incentives to reduce price or improve on the product’s or service’s capabilities. The government 
could potentially pay for the highest price for the least amount of innovation, performance, and 
quality. The trade-off to the sole source versus competition is the unusual and compelling 
situation in which time is of the essence.  
Contractor performance is the measure of how well the contractor performed the contract 
based on the fit of the source selection and the quality of the technical evaluation. Specifically, it 
measures how well the contractor met the requirements in terms of schedule, cost, and 
performance, as well as the terms and conditions set forth in the contract. Contractor 
performance measures how well the contractor met the customers’ expectations. 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive correlation between the fit/appropriateness of a source 
selection and contractor performance. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between technical evaluation effectiveness 
and contractor performance. 
d. Buyer Satisfaction 
Customer satisfaction is important. According to the stakeholder theory, customers are 
the lifeblood of any organization (firm). Ensuring their satisfaction is critical to an organization’s 
existence. The role of management within the organization is to ensure that the appreciable 
measures (e.g., customer service, highest quality products and services, and professionalism) are 
in place to ensure its customers keep coming back. For the contracting activity, the customer 
cannot set up or bind the government into contracts. The customer does not know the intricate 
procurement system of regulations and statutes. It is important for the agency to act on the 
customer’s behalf. The agency must award contracts to suppliers (contractors) to provide a 




an important role in customer satisfaction. The agency’s commitment to the customer is 
displayed by responsiveness and resolution of customer concerns, problems, and complaints 
(Anderson, Swaminathan, & Mehta, 2013).  
If the contracting officer (employee) has a concern about the customer’s concerns, 
problems, and complaints, the contracting officer could change the acquisition plan to using 
trade-off or LPTA. The contracting officer could use LPTA instead of trade-off to keep a certain 
contractor in the competition to satisfy the customer. If the contracting officer is concerned about 
a protest, he or she could use LPTA.  
The use of LPTA could potentially cause degradation in the customer’s satisfaction. As 
companies reduce their costs to meet the terms and conditions of the contract, they cut key 
elements (e.g., people, level of service, material quality) of their productions. Cutting key 
elements decreases the performance and increases the cost and the amount of time. This 
degradation causes lower buyer satisfaction, as the customer must add more funds and time to 
the procurement while losing out on the original performance parameters set.  
Hypothesis 9: There is a direct positive relationship between contractor’s performance 
based on the source selection method used and the buyer’s satisfaction. 
e. PALT Actual 
 PALT is one metric that can increase if fear causes members of the source selection team 
to re-evaluate themselves. Naturally, as the concern over a protest grows, acquisition teams take 
added measures to prevent them. This will increase the iterations of documents that are generated 
and will ultimately prolong the review process. These added measures consume time during the 
source selection. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 10: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the 
actual PALT. 
f. Resources 
The composition of the SST is customized for each acquisition. The structure of the SST 
depends on the nature of the acquisition and the agency’s regulations (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 52). 
The source selection council (SSC) is another group that is added to the SST. The SSC function 
is to be advisory and an independent reviewer of high dollar or high visible acquisitions. When  
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the SSC is not formed, other government advisors (e.g., legal) can function and provide their 
expertise (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD [AT&L)), 2011, p. 7) 
The typical source selection board includes no more than three to five members. 
However, the more significant procurement is to an agency, the larger the board is likely to be 
(Edwards, 2006, p. 69). To avoid a protest, an agency might add more members to the source 
selection boards. 
Hypothesis 11: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the 
number of Human Resources assigned to the source selection team. 
g. Transaction Costs  
The DOD has experienced a significant increase in the number of competitive source 
selection decisions that are protested by industry. Protests are extremely detrimental to the 
warfighter and the taxpayer. These protest actions consume vast amounts of the time of 
acquisition, legal, and requirements team members, and delay program initiation and the delivery 
of capability (Schwartz et al., 2009, p. 13).  
The transaction cost focuses on the organization of transactions that occur whenever a 
good or service is transferred from a provider to a user across a technologically separable 
interface. When transactions occur within an organization, the transaction costs can include 
managing and monitoring personnel and procuring inputs and capital equipment (Pint & 
Baldwin, 1997). 
In this research, the transaction costs reflect the monetary cost of resources devoted to 
preventing a protest. This includes the different acquisition professions (contracting officer, 
contracting specialist, technical evaluator, legal, cost/price analyst, past performance team, 
program manager, Small Business Association [SBA] representative, and consultant), their labor 
rates, and the amount of their time. This transaction cost could be considered an opportunity cost 
of resources not devoted to other requirements and contracts in the queue. 




h. Number of Awarded Contracts  
Multiple award contracts (MACs) are solicitations that are broken into several contracts 
for different companies. This includes task orders and indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 
(IDIQ). A contracting officer might use MACs because they offer many advantages. According 
to the Office of Management and Budget,  
In order for agencies to take continuous advantage of the benefits of competition 
after contract award, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) provides that 
agencies may make multiple awards of task and delivery order contracts for the 
same or similar supplies or services (and from the same solicitation) to two or 
more sources. The use of multiple award contracts allows agencies to take 
continuous advantage of the competitive forces of the commercial marketplace 
which will result in lower prices, better quality, and reduced time from 
requirements identification to award, and improved contractor performance in 
satisfying customer requirements. (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], 
1997)  
One of the other advantages of using MACs is to reduce the likelihood of a protest by awarding 
contracts to multiple companies.  
Under FAR 16.505 10 (i) (a), no protest under FAR 33.1 is authorized in connection with 
the issuance or proposed issuance of an order under a task-order contract or delivery-order 
contract, except for “a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, maximum 
value of the contract.” 
For the Navy’s LCS program, the Navy wanted to award two contracts to two competing 
shipyards. This increased competition, lowered the cost, and prevented a protest. A December 
13, 2010 press report on the LCS program stated, “One high-level Navy source recently said that 
without the dual-ship approach, ‘there is 100 percent chance of a protest’” (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 
68). As a result of this fear, the Navy changed its acquisition plan from a down select to a dual-
award strategy.  
Hypothesis 13: The higher the level of fear of protest, the greater of the number of 
awarded contracts. 
i. Contracting Officer Authority  
In some agencies, legal employees are considered advisors. According to Rumbaugh 
(2010, p. 270), advisors are subject matter experts who provide technical expertise and advice to 
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the evaluators. Advisors may read the proposal, document their findings, and make 
recommendations to the evaluators. Advisors offer specific input in their area of expertise and 
may only be asked to evaluate a limited subset of evaluation factors.  
As advisors, legal is part of the acquisition process. Legal is invited to the technical 
evaluations. In some agencies, it is an internal policy to have legal review proposals before they 
go forward. If there is a protest, legal must defend the agency’s actions against the GAO and/or 
the protester’s legal team. Legal must devote hours and resources away from other requirements. 
In many cases, its focus is on the protest. Legal understands the importance of the protest and the 
effects it has on the agency and the customer. Not only is legal’s time devoted to the protest, but 
the contracting officers’ and evaluators’ time is also a factor when justifying its actions to the 
Government Affairs Office, protester’s legal time, or the parent agency. With a lot of legal 
consequences, legal is overly conservative of preventing a protest. Since legal plays an important 
role in the acquisition process, Contracting officers rely heavily on its opinion and 
recommendations. This statement is supported by the feedback received during our interviews. 
According to one interviewee, “They [legal] are only advisory, but we rely very heavily on their 
opinion.” Another interviewee shared the same concern: 
Part of legal’s opinion may sometimes tend to be narrow-minded. Sometimes they 
tend to not consider the real world. How should I put that? Hmm. They might see 
things their way and not really how it works. We almost never move forward 
unless they [legal] give us their okay. It would be very, very hard—very 
challenging.  
Contracting officers are the only ones that can legally bind the government in a contract. 
They have the final authority. Legal, in its advisory role, influences the contracting officer’s 
authority through its opinion and recommendations. 
Hypothesis 14: There is a direct negative relationship between fear of protest and the 
contracting officer’s authority. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A total of 14 relationships were hypothesized based on the relevant literature. A depiction 
of the conceptual model can be found in Figure 1. A summary of the hypothesis can be found in 
Table 2. Chapter III presents the research and statistical methods that are employed, along with 
the measurement scales that are used to measure the relationships in the conceptual model.  
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Table 2.   Summary Table of Hypothesis 
Notation Hypothesis 
H1 Insufficient PALT has a direct positive relationship on the level of fear of 
protest. 
H2 The greater a contracting officer’s competence level, the lower the level of 
fear of protest. 
H3 The level of requirement criticality/importance has a positive impact on the 
level of fear of protest. 
H4 As protest risk increases, the level of fear of protest increases. 
H5 The level of fear of protest has a negative effect on the technical evaluation 
effectiveness. 
H6 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the Source 
Selection method fit/ appropriateness. 
H7 There is a positive correlation between the fit/appropriateness of a source 
selection and contractor performance. 
H8 There is a positive relationship between technical evaluation effectiveness 
and contractor performance. 
H9 There is a direct positive relationship between contractor’s performance 
based on the source selection method used and the Buyer’s satisfaction. 
H10 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the actual 
PALT. 
H11 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the 
number of Human Resources assigned to the source selection team. 
H12 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and transaction 
costs. 
H13 The higher the level of fear of protest, the greater of the number of awarded 
contracts. 
H14 There is a direct negative relationship between fear of protest and the 




Figure 1.  Conceptual Model 
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This chapter begins by discussing the interview construction and rationalizing the sample 
by discussing the method used to sample the population of contracting professionals. Next, the 
survey design and construct measurements are presented. Finally, the design and validation of 
the conceptual model for analyzing the antecedents and consequences of protest fear along with 
the statistical methodology for analyzing the relationships of the model are discussed.  
B. INTERVIEWS 
The next step in the validation process was to interview subject matter experts. The 
purpose was to validate the hypothesized model and to develop and validate the measures of 
constructs that did not have existing measurement scales. As such, the interviews provided 
content validity and construct validity. Navy contracting officers at the Commander Naval Space 
and Warfare Headquarters and at the Navy Fleet Logistics Center San Diego were chosen for 
interviews because of (a) the convenience of travel, (b) a willingness to support the research, and 
(c) the availability of a wide variety of contract types and contracted goods and services for wide 
generalizability (e.g., external validity). A series of questions (see Table 3) was asked to each 
participant. All responses were unrehearsed and not coerced.  
Table 3.   Interview Questions 
 Interview question 
1 How important to you is avoiding a bid protest?  
2 Why is avoiding a bid protest important? 
3 What are the negative consequences of a bid protest? 
4 Are there any positive outcomes of receiving a bid protest? 
5 Are some members of the source selection team more fixated on avoiding a 
bid protest than others? Who? Why? 
6 If there were no ability to protest, would you have done anything differently 
in the past on a source selection (e.g., acquisition strategy elements)?  
7 Do you believe that source selection teams alter acquisition strategies in 
order to avoid bid protests? What are the outcomes of these alterations?  
8 What extraordinary measures have you observed or heard of that source 
selection teams have taken to avoid a bid protest? 
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A total of 18 individuals were interviewed over two days between the two commands. 
Demographics of each respondent can be found in Table 4. Each interview was recorded and 
transcribed. The average interview lasted 26 minutes. The interviews resulted in eight hours and 
three minutes of recordings, which transcribed into 229 pages. 
Interviewees were given a copy of the conceptual model during the interview and asked 
whether they agreed with the independent variables being used. They were also asked if they 
would add any or take any away. One of the respondents, a supervisory contracting officer with 
29 years of experience, stated, “Okay. This is good. I don’t see anything that I need to add.” 
Another contracting officer with 18 years of experience who had recently dealt with a pre-award 
protest stated, “I think this is a great research that you are doing because this is a bigger and 
bigger issue. I think you are right on.” Other statements that validated the model were, “I think I 








Table 4.   Interview Demographics 














GS-14 F Supv. Contracting officer 29 12 0 
CPFF, T&M, 
FFP 
GS-13 M Contracting officer 26 9 3 
CPFF, T&M, 
FFP 
GS-13 M Contracting officer 18 6 1 Various 
GS-14 M Supv. Contracting officer 36 1 0 Various 
GS-13 F Contracting officer 6 4 0 
CPFF, T&M, 
FFP 
GS-14 F Supv. Contracting officer 32 3 0 Various 
GS-12 M Contract Specialist 4 0 0 Various 
GS-13 M Contracting officer 6 6 0 Various 
GS-12 M Contract Specialist 7 4 2 
FFP, CPFF, 
CPAF 
GS 13 M Contracting officer 21 1 0 FFP, Cost 
GS 13 F Contracting officer 30 4 0 FFP, Cost 
GS 13 M Contracting officer 22 5 0 
CPFF; CPIF; 
FFP 
GS 13 F Contracting officer 15 5 1 CPFF; CPAF 
GS 13 M Contracting officer 26 20 1 FFP; CPFF 
C. POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
After the interview testimonies confirmed the conceptual model, a survey to collect the 
quantitative data was developed. The population for this study consisted of only the continental 
United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) U.S. Navy civilian 
and military contracting. The research was limited to the Navy because of time and sponsorship 
constraints. The sample was constrained to contracting officers who had executed a FAR Part 
15-based formal source selection with a dollar amount of greater than $150,000. The rationale 
was to remove contracting officers who primarily execute acquisitions below the simplified 
acquisition threshold and who conduct non-competitive procurements. Several constraints 
existed for surveying this population. A list of e-mail addresses was generated using data 
extracted from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS–NG) database to 
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encompass all transactions that fit the criteria previously stated. Because of the costs required to 
mail a sufficient quantity of surveys to contracting personnel and the resources required to 
manually input responses into a dataset, a web-based survey was deployed to each individual e-
mail address generated from FPDS–NG data.  
The unit of analysis for this survey was a source selection. Since nearly all bid protests 
stem from a protestable action (e.g., a proposal rating, rating justification, or basis of a trade-off 
analysis) associated with a source selection, this is the proper unit of analysis for the study. 
Respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions using their experience from their 
most recently completed FAR Part 15 source selection. The most recent source selection was 
required to serve as the basis of reference in order to prevent respondents’ self-selection bias. 
D. SURVEY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT 
There were 115 questions used to measure the 16 variables in the conceptual model. The 
interview informants reviewed the measures of new constructs and found their content to capture 
the full meaning of the constructs being measured. All scales measuring latent constructs used a 
Likert-type scale. Questions collecting continuous data, such as dollar value, planned PALT, 
actual PALT, iterations of source selection documents, and quantity of personnel assigned did 
not use Likert-type scales.  
Fear of protest is a term used for this research to identify the level of apprehension a 
contracting professional has about receiving a bid protest. Since the fear of protest construct was 
substantiated during the literature review and through qualitative interviews, six questions were 
constructed to measure the level of fear of protest among the respondents to the survey, shown in 
Table 5. No previously-validated scales were available to measure the fear of protest. One 






Table 5.   Construct Measurement of Fear of Protest 
Scale Item Survey Question 
FEAR
1
* At some point during the development of the acquisition strategy or the source 








* I was anxious to get beyond the 10-day point after contract award (or 









** During the development of the acquisition strategy and throughout proposal 





** During the development of the acquisition strategy and throughout proposal 
evaluation, to what extent was at least one other member of the source selection 
team concerned that an offeror might protest the contract award? 
  * anchors of strongly agree and strongly disagree 
** anchors of not at all concerned and extremely concerned 
# item was discarded due to Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The contracting officer authority construct described how empowered the contracting 
officer is to make final decisions during the source selection process. The contracting officer 
authority factor was validated through qualitative interviews. Six questions were constructed to 
measure the contracting officer’s authority to make decisions, which are shown in table 6. There 
were no previously-validated scales available for this construct. The construct consisted of six 
questions using a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly agree and strongly 







Table 6.   Construct Measurement of Contracting Officer Authority 
Scale Item Survey Question 
CO_AUTH
1














 If I disagreed with an aspect of a legal opinion/review, I had the latitude to 




#* I had to change documents generated during the source selection to 




* I might as well not have a warrant since my decisions were overridden by 
reviewers. 
# item was discarded due to Exploratory Factor Analysis 
* item was reverse coded 
 
The antecedent insufficient PALT was validated by qualitative interviews and vetting by 
contracting practitioners. Three questions, shown in Table 7, were constructed to measure the 
sense of urgency created by insufficient PALT planned in the milestones and allocated by the 
acquisition team and its managers to conduct the source selection. The scales were developed 
from a study on services sourcing performance (Muir, 2010). The variable consisted of three 
questions using a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly agree and strongly 
disagree. 
Table 7.   Construct Measurement of Insufficient PALT Planned 
Scale Item Survey Question 
PALT_P
1








I had sufficient time to get this contract awarded. 
* item was reverse coded 
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The technical evaluation effectiveness construct was also validated by qualitative 
interviews. Six questions were constructed, shown in Table 8, to measure the technical 
evaluators’ level of confidence associated with the quality of the technical evaluations of 
offerors’ proposals. There were no previously-validated scales available for this factor. The 
variable consisted of six questions using a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly 
agree and strongly disagree. Three variables from this construct were discarded as a result of 
factor analysis.  
Table 8.   Construct Measurement of Technical Evaluation Effectiveness 
Scale Item Survey Question 
TEE
1
#* At least once, a technical evaluator was required to change the wording of his 
or her technical evaluations. 
TEE
2
* At least one technical evaluator expressed concern about not being able to 
say what needs to be said in the technical evaluation. 
TEE
3
* At least one technical evaluator was concerned that the constraints imposed 




#* The technical evaluators believed that the quality of their evaluations could 
not have been better. 
TEE
5
#* If there were no Federal Acquisition Regulations, no source selection policy, 
and no threat of a bid protest, the quality of the technical evaluations would 
have been the same.  
TEE
6
* Upon evaluation of proposals, at least one technical evaluator expressed a 
need to change at least one evaluation criterion or its definition. 
# item was discarded due to Exploratory Factor Analysis 
* item was reverse coded 
Requirement criticality/importance is the level of significance of a particular acquisition 
at the macro level. The requirement criticality/importance factor was validated by qualitative 
interviews. Table 9 shows the five questions that were used to measure the acquisition’s 
importance with regard to the overall mission of the agency. The questions were formulated from 
studies conducted on procurements in business-to-business markets (Schoenherr & Mabert, 
2011). The variable used a seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly agree and 
strongly disagree. Two variables from this construct were discarded as a result of factor analysis.  
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Table 9.   Construct Measurement of Requirement Criticality/Importance 
Scale Item Survey Question 
RCI
1

















An unsuccessful outcome of the RFP would have had only minor 




# As a portion of the customer’s total annual spending amount, the dollar value 
of this requirement was high. 
RCI
6
 As a portion of the customer’s total annual spending amount, the dollar value 
of this requirement was high. 
# item was discarded due to Exploratory Factor Analysis 
* item was reverse coded 
Buyer satisfaction represents the level of contentment the agency has with the 
contractor’s performance that won the source selection in question. The buyer satisfaction factor 
was validated by qualitative interviews. Table 10 shows the five questions that were constructed 
to measure the level of satisfaction that resulted from the source selection being surveyed. The 
scale was adapted from a study conducted on buyer-seller relationships in commercial markets 
(Cannon & Perreault, 1999). The variable consisted of five questions using a seven-point Likert-
type scale with anchors of strongly agree and strongly disagree. One variable from this construct 








Table 10.   Construct of Buyer Satisfaction 
Scale Item Survey Question 
BS
1
#* Our customer regrets the decision to do business with this contractor. 
BS
2








* Our customer is not completely happy with this contractor. 
BS
5
# If we had to do it all over again, we would still choose to use this contractor. 
 
# item was discarded due to Exploratory Factor Analysis 
* item was reverse coded 
Contractor performance is the overall measure of the successful offeror’s adherence to 
contract obligations. Vetting from industry practitioners validated the contractor performance 
construct. Table 11 shows the seven aspects of contract execution that were used to measure the 
level of contractor performance that resulted from the contracts awarded from the source 
selections for which respondents answered the survey questions. The scale was adapted from 
past marketing and operations management studies (Fawcett, Smith, & Cooper, 1997; Cannon, 
Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Prahinski & Benton, 2004). The variable consisted of five questions 











Table 11.   Construct Measurement of Contractor Performance 
Scale Item Survey Question 
CP
1
 Product/service quality per specifications 
CP
2




















 Overall performance 
Vetting from industry practitioners validated the protest risk construct. Protest risk was 
an exploratory construct that consists of two parts since risk is comprised of the product of the 
magnitude of the consequences and the probability of occurrence. Table 12 shows the questions 
used to assess the desirability of each of five consequences and each of their associated 
probabilities of occurring. The five consequences were validated by interview informants to be 
those most likely to occur and those most abhorred. Risk was calculated by multiplying the 
consequences’ probability of occurrence by the desirability of the consequence. The result 
yielded an overall protest risk score. The construct consisted of five possible consequences using 
a Likert-type scale with anchors of completely undesirable and completely desirable, and then 
listed the same five consequences using a probability of occurance scale with anchors of 0 








Table 12.   Construct Measurement of Protest Risk 
Scale Item Survey Question 
PR
1
 Increased costs to settle a terminated contract(s). 
PR
2












Career repercussions for making a mistake or omission that caused a bid 
protest.  
 
 risk = probability of occurrence x magnitude of consequences 
Source selection method appropriateness is the perceived extent that the chosen source 
selection method fits the requirement, the goals of the source selection, the commercial market, 
and the acquisition situation. The source selection method appropriateness factor is new. The 
factor was validated by qualitative interviews. The decision about the source selection method to 
be used is made very early on in the acquisition. The variable consisted of six questions using a 
seven-point Likert-type scale with anchors of strongly disagree and strongly agree, shown in 











Table 13.   Source Selection Method Appropriateness 
Scale Item Survey Question 
SSMA
1
 Our acquisition strategy was the best means to source our requirement. 
SSMA
2









 The source selection method we used (e.g.., LPTA, full-trade-off, or PPT) 




Our acquisition strategy ensured we selected the best offeror. 
SSMA
6
 Our acquisition strategy provided the best fit to the buying situation (e.g., 
complexity, dollar value, acquisition objectives, contract length, performance 
risk, criticality to the mission, availability of supply, time available to award 
a contract, etc.). 
 
The source selection method fit variable is an exploratory concept that had not been 
previously tested. Answers to the questions in Table 14 were used to explore various aspects of 
the overall source selection. This is a more objective measure of the same construct in Table 13, 
source selection method appropriateness. Source selection method fit measures the difference in 
time and resources used, method used, and satisfaction with discussions. Measures for each 
question are listed at the bottom of Table 14. 
Table 14.   Source Selection Method Fit 
Scale Item Survey Question 
SSMF
1
* During acquisition planning, how many days were planned in the 
milestones from receipt of a complete requirements package to award 
of the contract(s)? 
SSMF
2
* Number of actual days from receipt of a complete requirements 
package to award of the contract: 
SSMF
3
* Number of people on the source selection team including all advisors, 
reviewers, full-time participants, and part-time participants:  
SSMF
4
* Absent a risk of a bid protest, in your opinion, how many people ideally 
should have been on the source selection team: 
SSMF
5
** What source selection method was used? (Select one.) 
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Scale Item Survey Question 
SSMF
6
*** Rate the appropriateness of each source selection method for the 
requirement on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents “completely 
inappropriate” and 7 represents “completely appropriate.” LPTA 
(Lowest Price Technically Acceptable) 
SSMF
7
*** PPT (Price-Past Performance Trade-off ) 
SSMF
8
*** Full Trade-off 
SSMF
9
**** Rate your level of satisfaction with the freedom to openly discuss those 
aspects of the proposals that needed to be discussed with the offeror in 




***** Hypothetically, if there was no ability to protest, rate the extent that 
discussions with offerors would have differed. 
SSMF
11




****** Did you conduct discussions? 
SSMF
13
*** Considering the risk, criticality, dollar value, contribution to the 
mission, and complexity, rate the appropriateness of awarding a 
contract without conducting discussions. 
SSMF
14
****** Did offerors make oral presentations? 
SSMF
15
*** Considering the risk, criticality, dollar value, contribution to the 
mission, and complexity, rate the appropriateness of not utilizing oral 
presentations. 
  * Measured by text input into a field 
** Used a drop box with appropriate choices 
*** Likert-type scale with anchors of completely appropriate and 
completely inappropriate 
**** Likert-type scale with anchors of completely satisfied and 
completely dissatisfied 
***** Likert-type scale with anchors of no difference and substantial 
difference 
****** Choices of Yes or No 
 
The number of awarded contracts variable was validated by qualitative interviews. The 
measure was used to analyze the difference between the number of contract awards that were 
planned and the number of contracts actually awarded. These were objective measures along a 
continuous scale. The questions used are shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15.   Measurement of Number of Awarded Contracts 
Scale Item Survey Question 
AC
1
 According to your acquisition planning, how many contracts were originally 




 How many contracts were actually awarded? 
 
The transaction costs variable is an objective measure that was used. This measure 
consisted of 25 items, shown in Table 16 and was validated through qualitative interviews and 
discussions with other industry practitioners. The first 10 items gathered the number of iterations 
of common source selection documents. They were represented by the abbreviation TCI. The last 
15 attempted to quantify in dollars the amount of time spent on the source selection by each 
member of the team, and were represented by the abbreviation TCP. The roles were assigned 
using information from the DOD source selection procedures (OUSD [AT&L], 2011). There was 
no previously validated scale to measure these transaction costs. Text boxes to gather data were 
used to answer these questions. 
Table 16.   Construct of Transaction Costs 
Scale Item Survey Question 
TCI
1
 During the source selection, how many iterations of each of the following 
documents were generated?  
 
Source selection decision document 
TCI
2


























 Cost/price analysis 
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 Evaluation briefing charts for reviewers and SS 
TCP
1
 For the following roles, please provide the number of people within that role, 
their grade(s)/rank(s), and the fraction of 1 year’s time. If no involvement, 
just skip to the next role. Contracting Officer 
TCP
2
















































 Other (description) 
TCP
15
 Other (data field) 
The competence factor was validated by qualitative interviews and discussions with 






Table 17.   Construct Measurement of Contracting Officer Competence 
Scale Item Survey Question 
C
1




 In how many source selections have you participated throughout your career? 
 
E. SURVEY PRE-TEST 
Six industry practitioners, which consisted of graduate-level students and professors who 
specialize in DOD contracting tested the initial survey. Feedback received was used to refine 
questions and limit survey length. Responses supported the proposed research hypothesis, but in 
order to shorten the survey, one antecedent—risk tolerance—was removed.  
Once constructed, the order of the survey questions was structured to reduce bias among 
scale items by mixing questions with like scales and scale anchors. The complete survey can be 
found in Appendix A. As required, the survey was reviewed and approved by the Navy Survey 
Office. An additional review was conducted through the Department of the Navy’s Institutional 
Review Board to ensure the protection of human subjects. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study attempts to answer the following questions via qualitative and quantitative 
methods:  
 Does a fear of protest exist in the acquisition workforce? 
 If so, what are the contributing factors?  
 If so, what are the outcomes?  
A conceptual model that included 16 variables was developed by the research team to 
identify those factors that contributed to protest fear and hypothesize what verifiable results 
could be observed. The model was then vetted by discussion with 22 current and previously-
warranted contracting officers and three Air Force and Navy contracting unit leaders for content, 
or face, validity.  
To precisely identify and measure the relationships shown in the conceptual model, 
quantitative analysis through hypothesis testing between each contributing and resulting variable 
and fear of protest was performed. The path diagram of the conceptual model (see Figure 1) 
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contains 14 relationships that represent the 14 hypotheses. The relationships between variables 
are depicted using arrows; “the directionality of causal paths begins from a variable at the 
arrow’s tail and ends at a variable about the arrow’s point” (Muir, 2010, p. 38). These arrows 
contain a plus or minus sign to reflect the expected direction of the relationship. The primary 
methods used to perform statistical analysis are simple and multiple linear regressions.  
Linear regression tries to model the relationship between two variables by fitting a linear 
equation to data on the X- and Y-axis. “The case of one dependent and independent variable is 
called simple linear regression. For more than one explanatory variable, it is called multiple 
linear regression” (“Linear Regression,” 1998). 
In linear regression, data is modeled “using linear predictor functions, and unknown 
model parameters are estimated from the data” (Stanton, 2001, p. 237). The result is known as a 
linear model. Most commonly, “linear regression refers to a model in which the conditional 
mean of Y given the value of X is an affine function of X” (Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003, p. 42). 
The purpose of causal modeling is to predict or explain phenomenon. Causal models are 
“appropriate for domains in which many modeled events can be conceptualized as processes 
causing other events which in turn trigger other processes” (Lemmer, 1993, p. 143). 
Multiple regression is a form of causal modeling that can be used to analyze the 
relationship between one dependent variable and several independent variables. The “flexibility 
and adaptability of multiple regression allow its use with almost any dependence relationship” 
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson p. 166). Multiple regression can be made applicable to a wide 
range of problems because of this flexibility. Its application is appropriate for two types of 
research problems: prediction and explanation. Prediction deals with the magnitude that the 
independent variable can predict the value of the dependent variable. Explanation uses regression 
coefficients for the independent variables and “attempts to develop a substantive or theoretical 
reason for the effects of the independent variables” (Hair et al., p. 167).  
The goal of this research is not to predict the level of the fear dependent variable, but to 
explain the significance of its relationships with the independent variables that are used. Multiple 
regression is the appropriate tool to answer the questions being asked because it can objectively 
asses the magnitude and character of the relationships of the conceptual model. When regression 
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analysis is performed, it is assumed that there will be a linear association between the dependent 
and independent variables. With multiple regression, “transformations or additional variables are 
available to assess whether other types of relationships exist, particularly curvilinear 
relationships. This flexibility ensures that the researcher may examine the true nature of the 
relationship beyond the assumed linear relationship” (Hair et al., p. 168). 
G. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the qualitative interviews that occurred were discussed. Next, the 
population and sampling methods, followed by the survey design and construct measurement 
was discussed. Finally, the research design and statistical method used for the data analysis was 





A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the results of the survey, hypothesis testing, and conceptual model. 
The data collection results are discussed first, followed by the sample demographics. The results 
of tests for normality, outliers, non-response bias, reliability, and validity are then discussed. 
Next, the results of the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) are performed in SPSS Statistics 
Version 22.0. The results of the regression analyses performed are then discussed. Finally, the 
conceptual model with all hypothesized relations is presented. 
When analyzing the significance of the relationship between constructs, the path 
coefficient is used to measure strength. Alpha levels that are less than .05 are considered to have 
a strong relationship between dependent and independent variables.  
B. DATA COLLECTION  
Data was collected from a NPS-approved web-based survey tool, Lime survey. A survey 
invitation (Appendix B) was sent via e-mail to contracting officers who had executed a FAR Part 
15-based formal source selections with a dollar value greater than or equal to $150,000 during 
FY2013. E-mail addresses were extracted from the FPDS–NG database. A memorandum of 
support from the Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisitions and Procurement) was 
referred to in the e-mail to notify the respondents of sponsorship (Appendix C). The survey was 
left active for 42 days, with three reminder invitations being sent during that time. The survey 
was sent to a population of 4,279 unique e-mail addresses. Of these unique addresses, 260 
undeliverable responses were received, and 137 individuals replied stating that they had not 
participated in a FAR Part 15 Source Selection. As a result, the total population was reduced to 
3,882. At the survey closure, there were 661 responses received, which yielded a 17.02 percent 
response rate. Of the responses received, 311 had to be deleted because of missing or invalid 
data, leaving 350 usable responses. The final response rate of usable responses is 9.01 percent.  
While the response rate is low, it is not unlike that of other published business research. 
In a study focused on declining response rates in supply chain management research, Melnyk, 
Page, Wu, and Burns (2012) stated that “the issue of declining response rates is a growing 
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concern” (p. 35). Their research showed a sharp decline starting in 2002, with a steady decline of 
one percent annually. Five top journals reported low end survey response rates ranging from 
three percent to eight percent. Survey length is thought to be a one of the key contributors to the 
decline. Melnyk et al. further stated that “for every additional question over 20, the researcher 
can expect the response rate to fall by 0.12 percentage points. Consequently, the researcher can 
expect the response to fall by over seven percentage points in response to an 80 question 
survey.” (Melnyk et al., 2012, p. 43) The summary descriptive statistics from the remaining 350 
usable responses can be found in Table 18. 
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Table 18.   Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Measure N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variable Measure N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Fear FEAR1 350 1 7 4.37 1.919 Protest Risk PR1 350 1 11 3.44 2.86
FEAR2 350 1 7 4.22 1.887 PR2 350 1 11 2.53 2.294
FEAR3 350 1 7 4.41 1.959 PR3 350 1 11 5.42 3.114
FEAR4 350 1 7 3.82 1.765 PR4 350 1 10 3.51 2.87
FEAR5 350 1 7 3.33 1.666 PR5 350 1 11 4.63 3.215
FEAR6 350 1 7 3.38 1.708 PR1 350 0.00% 100.00% 48.17% 31.01%
PR2 350 0% 100% 75.09% 28.25%
Contracting Officer Authority CO_AUTH1 350 1 7 5.27 1.546 PR3 350 0.00% 100.00% 36.09% 31.57%
CO_AUTH2 350 1 7 5.43 1.452 PR4 350 0% 100% 74.26% 28.55%
CO_AUTH3 350 1 7 5.6 1.341 PR5 350 0.00% 100.00% 33.23% 30.27%
CO_AUTH4 350 1 7 3.84 1.703
CO_AUTH5 350 1 7 4.17 1.887
Source Selection 
Method Appropriateness SSMA1 350 1 7 5.51 1.315
CO_AUTH6 350 1 7 3.1 1.759 SSMA2 350 1 7 5.61 1.243
SSMA3 350 1 7 5.17 1.532
PALT Planned PALT_P1 350 1 7 4.38 1.795 SSMA4 350 1 7 5.76 1.292
PALT_P2 350 1 7 3.36 1.764 SSMA5 350 1 7 5.52 1.339
PALT_P3 350 1 7 3.83 1.75 SSMA6 350 1 7 5.51 1.395
SSMA7 350 0 1000000 3168.97 53702.779
Technical Evaluation Effectiveness TEE1 350 1 7 5.33 1.584 SSMA8 350 0 200 2.89 14.252
TEE2 350 1 7 3.5 1.714 SSMA9 350 0 150 3.04 13.574
TEE3 350 1 7 3.37 1.628
TEE4 350 1 7 4.37 1.434
Source Selection 
Method Fit SSMF1 350 0 780 182.97 131.168
TEE5 350 1 7 3.03 1.817 SSMF2 350 0 3290 236.72 244.081
TEE6 350 1 7 3.47 1.744 SSMF3 350 0 138 8.96 10.052
SSMF4 350 0 130 7.65 9.053
Requiement Criticality/Importance RCI1 350 1 7 5.9 1.093 SSMF5 350 1 3 2.12 0.931
RCI2 350 1 7 5.79 1.135 SSMF6 350 1 7 4.16 2.181
RCI3 350 1 7 5.77 1.142 SSMF7 350 1 7 3.82 1.776
RCI4 350 1 7 2.41 1.423 SSMF8 350 1 7 4.89 2.061
RCI5 350 1 7 4.15 1.666 SSMF9 350 1 7 3.28 1.718
RCI6 350 1 7 4.15 1.668 SSMF10 350 1 7 3.37 2.041
SSMF13 350 1 7 4.2 2.113
Buyer Satisfaction BS1 350 1 7 2.44 1.359 SSMF15 350 1 7 4.7 2.099
BS2 350 1 7 5.5 1.232
BS3 350 1 7 5.46 1.176
Actual Number of 
Contracts Awarded AC1 350 0 60 2.24 4.879
BS4 350 1 7 3.02 1.474 AC2 350 0 55 2.39 5.506
BS5 350 1 7 5.61 1.225
Contractor Performance CP1 350 1 7 4.69 1.372
CP2 350 1 7 4.74 1.32
CP3 350 1 7 4.74 1.32
CP4 350 1 7 4.76 1.303
CP5 350 1 7 4.75 1.261
CP6 350 1 7 4.53 1.213
CP7 350 1 7 4.88 1.223
52 
C. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS  
From the 350 usable responses, the average respondent had 13.6 years of federal 
contracting experience. There were 314 respondents who elected to identify their gender. Results 
were even with male respondents accounting for 50.64 percent and female respondents 
accounted for 49.36 percent. The majority of respondents represented had at least a bachelor’s 
degree. Only 2.29 percent of respondents held a high school diploma or general equivalency 
diploma, 3.14 percent held an associate’s degree, 38 percent held a bachelor’s degree, 54 percent 
held a master’s degree, and only 2.57 percent of respondents held a doctorate degree. As to be 
expected, respondents’ Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) certification 
levels in contracting were skewed to higher levels. Typically, more experienced contracting 
professionals conduct FAR Part 15 source selections. Only 1.43 percent of the respondents held 
no APDP contracting certification, 2.86 percent held a Level I APDP certification, 37.43 percent 
held a Level II APDP certification, and 58.29 percent held a Level III APDP certification. 
Demographics for the education and certification levels of the respondents can be found in Table 
19. 
Table 19.   Education and Certification Demographics 
Education Level  % of Total 
 
Certification Level % of Total 
High School Diploma of GED 2.29% 
 
No Certification 1.43% 
Associate’s Degree 3.14% 
 
Level I 2.86% 
Bachelor’s Degree 38.00% 
 
Level II 37.43% 
Master’s Degree 54.00% 
 
Level III 58.29% 




Respondents were asked to refer back to the most-recent completed source selection 
above $150,000 in which they had participated. The range of contract type and type of 
products/services are reported (see Table 21). Of the respondents, 60 percent reported the use of 
fixed-priced, 27 percent reported cost reimbursement, one percent reported Time and Materials, 
one percent reported labor-hour, nine percent reported hybrid, and two percent reported as other. 
The type of supply or service bought was also reported. Services were bought in 58 percent of 
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the cases, construction made up 17 percent of the purchases, supplies or commodities made up 
16 percent, weapons systems made up seven percent, and other capital equipment made up three 
percent. Experience-related demographics information can be found in Table 20. 
Table 20.   Experience 
Years of Experience  Total 
 
Other Statistics Total 
Average of all respondents 13.12 
 
Avg Number of Source Selections 18.31 
Respondents with 5 or less years 110 (31.4%) 
 
Avg Number of Protests experienced 1.96 




Number (%) who had a protest 
sustained 
54 (15.4%) 






Table 21.   Contract Type and Item/Service Procured 
Contract Type  % of Total 
 
Supply or Service Purchased % of Total 
Fixed Price 60.00%  Services 58.00% 
Cost Reimbursement 27.14%  Construction 16.86% 
Time and Materials 1.14%  Supplies or Commodities 15.71% 
Labor Hours 0.57%  Weapons System 6.57% 
Hybrid 9.14%  Other Capital Equipment 2.86% 
Other 2.00%    
 
D. ASSUMPTIONS  
1. MISSING DATA 
Out of 661, there were 311 responses discarded because of missing data, leaving a total 
of 350 usable responses. Of these responses, 36 did not include a properly reported gender 
answer; these respondents were not included in the gender demographics reporting. The 
Transaction Cost variable had multiple missing and inconsistent items of data since this was an 
onerous task for respondents to complete, and since it was an optional part of the survey. 
Additionally, the survey collected the pay grade and allocation of time via open text fields 
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enabling inconsistent response formats. All reporting of this data includes only the complete 
responses with unambiguous data. Only 270 responses were able to be used for this analysis.  
2. OUTLIERS  
Outliers are classified as “a unique combination of characteristics identifiable as 
distinctly different from other observations” (Hair et al., p. 63). Outliers such as procedural error, 
extraordinary events, and extraordinary observations can arise for a variety of reasons. . Most of 
the questions contained in this survey were on a Likert-type scale where the ranges of responses 
were limited. 
The presence of Univariate and Multivariate outliers was tested using SPSS version 22. 
To conduct the Univariate test, the score of 10 variables were converted to standardized values, 
or z-scores. Then, the standard value was evaluated against a benchmark in which potential 
outliers had the z-score of ±3.00 or higher (Muir, 2010, p. 56). The range of standard scores can 
be seen in Table 22. Five variables had cases that were above or below the threshold. Contracting 
officer authority had five cases that were outside of the threshold; Requirement Criticality or 
Importance had three cases that were outside of the threshold; Buyer Satisfaction had four cases 
that were outside of the threshold; Contractor Performance had three cases that were outside of 
the threshold; and Source Selection Method Appropriateness had seven cases that were outside 
of the threshold. Each case was examined for inconsistent responses. This examination did not 
lead to any responses being discarded. 
Since multivariate detection involves several variables, the ability to measure the 
multidimensional position of each response relative to a common point is needed. The 
Mahalanobis Distance, or D
2
, is a multivariate assessment of each observation across a set of 
variables (Hair et al., 2010). The same 10 variables were used to calculate the D
2 
in SPSS. The 
critical value was 29.59 when 10 variables were used. Five cases exhibited a D
2 
score higher than 
29.59. Each case was examined for inconsistencies or incoherent responses. This examination 
also led to no responses being discarded. The Transaction Cost document iteration variable was 
also examined for incoherent responses. Twelve outlying responses were truncated to the highest 
reasonable score. “One alternative to transformation is truncation, wherein extreme scores are 
recorded to the lowest reasonable score” (Osborne & Overbay, 2004, p. 2). Reasonable scores 
were determined using the average number of iterations for each document. If, for example, a 
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response indicated that the respondents experienced 99 iterations of a document, this was 
considered an unrealistic response. This response was then truncated to the average iteration 
number for the subject document. 
Table 22.   Univariate Range of Standard Scores 
Variable N Minimum Maximum 
Zscore(FEAR) 350 -1.88982 1.96546 
Zscore(CO_AUTH) 350 -3.45073 1.13423 
Zscore(PALT_P) 350 -1.73510 2.04099 
Zscore(TEE) 350 -1.75669 2.55294 
Zscore(RCI) 350 -4.63729 1.18532 
Zscore(BS) 350 -4.72418 4.14633 
Zscore(CP) 350 -3.19421 1.94928 
Zscore(SSMA) 350 -4.06658 1.34293 
 
3. NORMALITY  
Normality is the most fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis and the 
benchmark for statistical methods. If the variation from the normal distribution is sufficiently 
large, all resulting statistical tests are invalid (Hair et al., 2010). The shape of normally 
distributed data is a symmetric bell-shaped curve. A distribution can be described by two basic 
measures, skewness and kurtosis. Skewness describes the lateral balance of the distribution. A 
positive skew describes a distribution that is shifted left, while a negative skew is shifted to the 
right. Kurtosis denotes the peak or flatness of a distribution when compared to a normal bell 
shaped distribution. Distributions with a higher, or more peaked, distribution are said to 
leptokurtic, while flatter distributions are said to be platykurtic (Hair et al., 2010).  
Graphical analysis of a distribution using a histogram is the easiest test for normality. 
However, this method can be less reliable with small sample sizes. The normal probability plot is 
the most reliable way to do a visual assessment of normality. The normal probability plot 
compares the distribution of the actual data with distribution of a normal distribution. The 




line. The Shapiro-Wilks test is another common normality test. This test is very powerful for 
smaller sample sizes (~50) but tends to be overly sensitive for samples of over 200 (Totton & 
White, 2011). 
Table 22 displays the statistics for skewness produced using descriptive statistics function 
in SPSS. Values above and below zero denote non-normality (Hair et al., 2010). While skewness 
scores of zero represent a perfectly normal distribution, moderately non-normal distributions are 
represented by scores greater than 2.0 (Curran, West, & Finch, 1995). Using a range for 
skewness of ±2.0, Table 22 showed nine variables that exceeded this threshold. In order to 
ensure the validity of statistical analysis, none of the variables were included in any constructs 
that were used to perform regression analysis.  
Table 23 also displays statistics for kurtosis. Normal distributions display a standardized 
kurtosis value of 3.0, and rescaled distributions display a value of zero (Hair et al., 2010). 
Curran, West, and Finch (1995) suggested that rescaled kurtosis values greater than or equal to 
seven are indicative of moderate non-normality. The table shows nine variables that exceeded 
this threshold. In order to ensure the validity of statistical analysis, none of these variables were 
included in any constructs that were used to perform regression analysis. 
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Table 23.   Normality Assessment 
 
 
           
Variable N Skewness Kurtosis  Variable N Skewness Kurtosis  Variable N Skewness Kurtosis 
FEAR1 350 -.426 -1.113  CP1 350 -.503 .401  TCI3*** 350 7.940 77.095 
FEAR2 350 -.331 -1.155  CP2 350 -.334 .252  TCI4 350 1.098 4.757 
FEAR3 350 -.418 -1.139  CP3 350 -.409 .145  TCI5 350 1.409 5.057 
FEAR4 351 .133 -1.042  CP4 350 -.175 .054  TCI6*** 350 2.853 13.738 
FEAR5 350 .367 -.597  CP5 350 -.339 .487  TCI7*** 350 2.737 14.525 
FEAR6 350 .369 -.582  CP6 350 -.014 .572  TCI8*** 350 2.758 16.025 
     CP7 350 -.266 .095  TCI9 350 .584 .595 
CO_AUTH1 350 -1.089 .571       TCI10 350 .050 .032 
CO_AUTH2 350 -1.238 1.108  SSMA1 350 -1.205 1.163      
CO_AUTH3 350 -1.390 1.909  SSMA2 350 -1.395 2.221  D_VAL 350 -.084 -1.086 
CO_AUTH4 350 -.089 -1.028  SSMA3 350 -.916 .039      
CO_AUTH5 47 -.096 -1.077  SSMA4 350 -1.649 2.729      
CO_AUTH6 350 -.506 -.723  SSMA5 350 -1.201 1.130      
     SSMA6 350 -1.368 1.529      
PALT_P1 350 .105 -1.152  SSMA7*** 350 18.447 343.056      
PALT_P2 350 .303 -1.056  SSMA8*** 350 9.659 115.466      
PALT_P3 350 -.050 -1.201  SSMA9*** 350 7.355 62.431      
              
TEE1 47 -1.668 2.098  SSMF1* 350 -.042 -.290      
TEE2 350 .357 -1.074  SSMF2* 350 1.027 5.386      
TEE3 350 .370 -.925  SSMF3* 350 1.446 4.539      
TEE4 350 .162 -.532  SSMF4* 350 1.726 6.957      
TEE5 350 -.601 -.830  SSMF5 50 -.290 -1.869      
TEE6 350 .322 -1.129  SSMF6 50 .100 -1.555      
     SSMF7 50 -.321 -.552      
RCI1 47 -1.336 2.326  SSMF8 50 -.748 -.466      
RCI2 350 -1.332 2.195  SSMF9 50 .378 -.750      
RCI3 350 -1.181 1.656  SSMF10 50 .181 -1.423      
RCI4 350 1.198 .730  SSMF13 50 -.342 -1.229      
     SSMF15 50 -.682 -.738      
BS1 47 .533 -1.084  C1 350 .757 -.696      
BS2 350 -1.270 1.604  C2** 350 1.434 6.889      
BS3 350 -1.153 1.502           
BS4 350 -.636 -.395  TCI* 350 .725 5.283      
BS5 47 -.492 -.990  TCI1*** 350 4.720 41.777      
     TCI2*** 350 3.668 38.750      
   * Transformed using the square root 
  **Transformed using the LOG 
***Items that could not be normalized, and were not included in any tests 
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4. NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
The extrapolation method was used to estimate bias. This is the most commonly used 
method when responses are received in “successive waves” (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The 
responses were received in three successive waves after follow-up e-mail reminders were sent to 
non-respondents. Responses were grouped into waves according to the order of arrival. Late 
respondents are defined as  
those who respond in the last wave of respondents in successive follow-ups to a 
questionnaire. In order to ensure that the number of late respondents is large 
enough to be meaningful practically and statistically, it is recommended that the 
minimum number of late respondents be 30. (Linder, 2001 p. 52)  
If the tests performed on this method does  
not produce sufficient statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the 
means are equal then it is not unreasonable to assert that the unobserved group of 
non-respondents has similar characteristics to those of the survey respondents and 
that non-respondents are missing at random. (Muir, 2010, p. 60) 
Based on the completion date of the survey, respondents were grouped into three 
categories. Group one (n = 113) represents those that responded within the first two days of the 
survey. Group two (n = 136) represents those that responded after the second follow up e-mail 
was sent, and Group three (n = 101) represents those that responded after the final follow up e-
mail was sent. Multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) was then conducted on nine latent 
variables to test the difference between means by early, middle, and late responders. Each 








Table 24.   Non-Response Bias Hypothesis 
Variable  Hypothesis 
Fear                         
Contracting Officer Authority                               
Planned PALT                                                 
Quality of Evaluation Factors                      
Requirement 
Criticality/Importance 
                     
Buyer Satisfaction                   
Contractor Performance                                     
Source Sel. Method 
Appropriateness 
                        
Protest Risk                                              
 
Levene’s test was calculated for each variable. The results are listed in Table 25. Since no 
statistic was significant at α = 0.05, then the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. Hence, there is 
little evidence that the variances are not equal, and homogeneity of variances can be assumed for 
all nine variables. Results of the univariate F-tests are shown in Table 26. An examination of the 
significance of the F-test statistics reveals that none are significant at a level of 0.05. As a result, 
there is no statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that group averages are equal in the 
nine variables, and it can be assumed that no bias exists between survey responders and survey 









Table 25.   Levene’s Test Results 
Variable 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
FEAR .526 2 347 .591 
CO_AUTH 
.014 2 347 .986 
PALT_P 1.777 2 347 .171 
TEE .204 2 347 .815 
RCI 2.060 2 347 .129 
BS .686 2 347 .504 
CP .279 2 347 .757 
SSMA .741 2 347 .477 
PR 2.526 2 347 .081 
 
Table 26.   Univariate F-Tests for Non-Response Bias 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
FEAR 150.652
a
 2 75.326 1.246 .289 
CO_AUTH 3.320
b
 2 1.660 .241 .786 
PALT_P 75.540
c
 2 37.770 1.873 .155 
TEE 2.104
d
 2 1.052 .060 .942 
RCI 2.474
e
 2 1.237 .290 .748 
BS 6.383
f
 2 3.192 1.117 .328 
CP 269.811
g
 2 134.906 2.035 .132 
SSMA 4.758
h
 2 2.379 .053 .948 
PR 4.769
i
 2 2.384 .406 .667 
C1 198.387
j
 2 99.193 .957 .385 
 
In summary, nine variables were tested for the presence of non-response bias using the 
extrapolation method and multivariate analysis of variance. The results of testing did not provide 
statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the means of the first, second, and third 
wave respondents’ variables were equal. It can be assumed that non-respondents missing from 
the sample are random and that further analysis will not be biased because of non-respondents 
(Muir, 2010, p. 60). 
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E. SAMPLE SIZE 
To ensure a valid measure fit of relationships, reduce any sample errors, and reduce the 
detrimental effects of non-normality, most researchers suggest using a sample size of 200 (Hair 
et al., 2010). However, it was also suggested that a minimum sample size of 100 could be used 
(Smith & Langfield-Smith, 2004). The effects of the sample size can be observed most in the 
statistical power of significance testing, and more importantly in the generalizability of the 
results. 
According to Hair et al. (2010), sample size must have the following for a factor analysis 
design: 
 The sample must have more observations than variables. 
 The minimum absolute sample size should be 50 observations. 
 Researchers should strive to maximize the number of observations per variable, 
with a desired ratio of 5 observations per variable.  
As a general rule, the ratio of observations to independent variables should never be 
below 5:1. The desired amount would be a ratio of 15 to 20:1. If this ratio can be achieved, the 
results should be generalizable. This study contains 15 variables with 350 observations, which 
yields a ratio of 23.33:1. This ratio more than satisfies the referenced generalizability guidelines. 
F. EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS  
As a preliminary step to establishing construct validity, scales were purified using 
exploratory factor analysis in SPSS Version 22. The factor loadings matrix produced is presented 
in Table 27. Factor analysis is a technique whose primary purpose is to define the underlying 
structure among variables. It is primarily used to analyze the structure of the correlations among 
a large number of variables by identifying sets of variables that have high influence on each 
other, known as factors (Hair et al., 2010). 
Factor loading is the correlation of a variable and the factor, while the squared loading is 
the amount of the variable’s total variance accounted for by the factor (Hair et al., 2010). When 
assessing the significance of factor loading, the first guideline is to do a preliminary examination 
of the factor loadings. The general rules for practical significance are: 
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 factor loadings ranging from ± .30 to ±.40 are the minimal level for interpretation 
of structure, 
 factor loading ± .50 are considered practically significant, and 
 factor loadings exceeding .70 are indicative of well-defined structure.  
Interpretation of the factor matrix starts with the first variable of the first factor and 
moved horizontally from left to right. The goal is to identify the highest loading of that factor. 
This is done for each variable until all have been examined. Variables with insignificant loadings 
are then discarded. When a variable is found to have more than one significant loading, it is 
called a cross loading variable. Cross-loaded variables should be minimized if possible. Once all 
significant loadings have been identified, reassessment is done, removing insignificant and 
highly cross-loaded variable. 
Nine variables were discarded because of insignificant loadings or high cross loadings. 
Four of the nine items were from established scales. All other variables retained displayed 
significance factors greater than the generally accepted threshold of .5. Only two items in the 
contracting officer authority construct contained significance loadings of less than .6. Five items 
displayed cross-loadings below the 0.300 limit recommended by Hair et al. (2010), but were 
maintained for summation. 
.
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Table 27.   Factor Loadings 
  Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FEAR1  .854       
FEAR2  .885       
FEAR3  .837       
FEAR5  .863       
FEAR6  .786       
COAUTH1     .862    
COAUTH2     .907    
COAUTH3     .819    
COAUTH4     .571   .232 
COAUTH6     .586  -.213  
PALTP1      .792   
PALTP2      .827   
PALTP3      .877   
TEE2       .889  
TEE3       .892  
TEE6       .609  
RCI2    -.906     
RCI3    -.901     
RCI4    -.831     
CP1 .910        
CP2 .928        
CP3 .877        
CP4 .828        
CP5 .896        
CP6 .807        
CP7 .886        
SSMA1   .866      
SSMA2   .837      
SSMA3   .764      
SSMA4   .733      
SSMA5   .762      
SSMA6   .805      
BS3 .264       .734 
BS4 .214       .662 
BS2 .223       .750 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Summated scales combine several like variables into a single composite measure. This is 
done by combining the variables that are highly loaded on a factor. Summated scales have two 
specific benefits: They provide a means of overcoming to some extent the measurement error 
inherent in all measured variables and its ability to represent multiple aspects of a concept in a 




Table 28.   Construct Descriptives 
Summated Construct N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
FEAR 350 5 35 19.71 7.782 -.107 -.798 
Contracting Officer Authority (CO_AUTH) 350 5 35 25.05 6.021 -.820 .447 
PALT Planned (PALT_P) 350 3 20 10.81 4.502 -.092 -.921 
Tech Eval Effectiveness (TEE) 350 3 21 10.34 4.177 .315 -.641 
Requirement Criticality (RCI) 350 4 21 17.15 3.008 -.847 .856 
Buyer Satisfaction (BS) 350 6 21 13.99 1.691 -.483 2.861 
Contractor Performance (CP) 350 7 49 33.08 8.166 -.201 .282 




Reliability is also a consideration in assessing the degree of consistency between multiple 
measures of a variable (Hair et al., 2010). Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect of 
construct validity. One measure of construct reliability is the Cronbach’s Alpha, which is also 
known as the reliability coefficient. The most widely used lower limit for Cronbach’s Alpha is 
.70, although .60 may be acceptable in exploratory research (Nunnally, 1978). Table 29 shows 
the reliability coefficients for summated scales resulting from exploratory factor analysis.  












G. HYPOTHESIZED MODELS  
The final step of analysis was the regression analysis of the hypothesized regression 
models in SPSS version 22. Three methods of regression were used to analyze various 
hypothesized relationships between constructs. Multiple regression was used to measure the left 
side of the model, which analyzed the factors that contributed to protest fear. Simple linear and 
logistic regressions were performed on the right side of the model to measure the resultant 
effects of protest fear.  
The model summary of each regression featuring the R
2
 and adjusted R
2 
values was 
analyzed to assess the total variation explained in the dependent variable by the independent 
variable(s). The significance value in the Analysis of Variation (ANOVA) table was then 
examined to determine the overall validity of the model. To test the validity of the model, the 
following hypotheses are assumed: 
                 
                                      
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If the null hypothesis is true, none of the independent variable is linearly related to the 
dependent variable, and the model is invalid or not statistically significant. A minimum of one 
   must be not equal to 0 for the model to have validity. The significance test in the ANOVA 
table combines multiple t-tests into a single test (Keller, 2008).  
The Coefficients table is the last part of the regression analysis. The Unstandardized 
Coefficients ( ) describe the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent 
variable. The significance value for each independent variable was then analyzed to determine 
statistical significance of each independent variable. All tests used an alpha ( ) value of 0.05, 
meaning that any significance value greater than   was deemed not significant. Alpha values 
between 0.05 and 0.10 were considered marginally significant.  
1. Antecedents of Fear Results 
Multiple regression analysis was performed on the summated constructs that measured 
the relationships identified in the left side of the model. A visual depiction of the model is shown 
in Figure 2. The model used Planned PALT (PALT_P), Dollar Value (D_VAL), Competency 
(C1 and C2), Requirement Criticality/Importance (RCI), and Protest Risk (PR) as independent 
variables measuring the variance in the dependent variable Fear (FEAR). 
The statistical significance of the model was then examined in the ANOVA table. The 
significance of the model was reported at .000 using an   value of 0.05. Since the significance is 
less than    we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between FEAR 
and the independent variables in the model. The ANOVA table is shown in Table 31. 
The Model Summary table for this model can be seen in Table 30. The Correlation 
Coefficient (R) was .361. The Coefficient of Determination (R
2





value means that 13.1 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained 
by the independent variables. The proportion left unexplained, which is called the coefficient of 
alienation, is .869. Sirkin (2006, p. 474) noted that there are “many real world factors that 
mitigate linearity in social sciences. It would be rare indeed to see coefficients of determination 
approaching 1.0 (or even .9 or.8) in social or behavioral research.” He then added that “R2 is a 
useful concept in statistics, it is less useful in the real world of data analysis in determining what 
is or is not a “good” linear relationship. Thus statistical significance is often used to demonstrate 
“good” relationships” (Sirken, 2006, p. 457). While the R2 values are high enough to substantiate 
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this model, the model also suggests that there are some unobserved factors that may explain 
more of the variance in the FEAR of protest variable. 
Finally, the Coefficients Table was examined for the   values and significance of each 
independent variable. Five out of six independent variables had significance values less than .05, 
with the variable Years of Experience having a significance value of .379. PALT Planned had a 
  value of -.259 and a significance of .004. This shows that as PALT is increased, the level of 
FEAR decreases by .259 (on a seven-point scale) assuming all other variables remain constant. 
Dollar Value had a   value of .721 with a significance value of .003. This shows that as Dollar 
Value increases by one unit, FEAR also increases by .721 (on a seven-point scale) assuming all 
other variables remain constant. It is important to note that the Dollar Value construct does not 
measure the actual dollar value of the acquisition. The actual dollar values were not normally 
distributed and therefore inappropriate for regression analysis. Requirement Criticality had a   
value of .431 with a significance value of .002. This shows that as Requirement Criticality 
increases by one unit, FEAR also increases by .431 (on a seven-point scale) assuming all other 
variables remain constant. Protest Risk had a   value of .374 with a significance value of .029. 
This shows that as Protest Risk increases by one unit, FEAR also increases by .374 (on a seven-
point scale) assuming all other variables remain constant. Years of Experience had a   value of 
.037 but was insignificant. The number of Source Selections had a   value of -.267 with a 
significance value of .011. This shows that as the Number of Source Selections increases by one 
unit, FEAR decreases by .267 (on a seven-point scale) assuming all other variables remain 
constant. Results of this test can be found in Table 32. A visual depiction of all relationships is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Table 30.   Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .131 .115 7.319 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Source Selections, 
Protest Risk, Dollar Value, Requirement Criticality, PALT 





Table 31.   ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2759.668 6 459.945 8.587 .000
b
 
Residual 18373.021 343 53.566   
Total 21132.689 349    
a. Dependent Variable: FEAR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Source Selections, Protest Risk, Dollar Value, 
Requirement Criticality, PALT Planned, Years of Experience 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 10.995 2.852  3.856 .000 
PALT Planned -.259 .091 -.150 -2.862 .004 
Dollar Value .721 .238 .155 3.032 .003 
Requirement Criticality .431 .135 .167 3.183 .002 
Protest Risk .374 .171 .116 2.190 .029 
Years of Experience .037 .042 .049 .881 .379 
Number of Source Selections -.267 .104 -.142 -2.558 .011 




Figure 2.  Left Side Hypothesized Model 
2. Consequences of Fear Results 
One of the objectives of this research is to determine the consequences of protest fear. 
Multiple variables were used to gauge the lengths that contracting personnel would take to avoid 
a protest. Some constructs, such as the amount of awarded contracts, were very straightforward 
in ascertaining whether a problem exists.  
The right side of the model was then tested through a combination of simple linear 
regressions and logistic regressions in SPSS Version 22. Key statistics of these tests can be found 
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in Table 33. Logistic regression, being well suited for analyzing dichotomous outcomes, is 
finding increased popularity in social science research (Peng & So, 2002). It is the appropriate 
statistical technique for performing analysis when the dependent variable is categorical. Hair et 
al. (2011) stated that Logistic Regression is best suited to deal with two research objectives: 
identifying the independent variables that impact group membership in the dependent variable, 
and establishing classification systems based on the logistic model for determining group 
membership. Logistic regression estimates the probability that a particular outcome will occur. 
The relationship between independent and dependent variable is expressed in the form of an odds 
ratio, which expresses the probability. If the ratio is positive, “an increase in that independent 
variable will result in an increase in the probability of the event” (Keller, 2008, p. 742). 
Linear regression was performed to analyze the relationship between the FEAR of protest 
and technical evaluation effectiveness (TEE), with FEAR being the independent variable and 
TEE being the dependent variable. TEE was measured using reverse-coded survey questions 
(items); thus, the inverse of the given responses was used in the test. There was a significant 
relationship (.000) between the two variables. The   coefficient was -.136, which was in the 
hypothesized direction. 
The second test performed was a linear regression analyzing the relationship between 
FEAR of protest and perceived source selection method appropriateness (SSMA), using FEAR 
as independent variable and SSMA as dependent variable. The test failed to reject the null 
hypothesis (.275) that there was no linear relationship between FEAR and SSMA. 
 Since this analysis dealt with the consequences of protest fear, some aspects of different 




 were used to 
measure the difference between planned and actual procurement lead-time (PALT). SSMF
1 
asked how many days were planned for the Source Selection in question, and SSMF
2
 asked how 
many days the Source Selection actually consumed. To understand the effects of the independent 
variable FEAR of protest on Actual PALT, source selections that took longer than planned were 
coded as 1 and those that were less or the same were coded as 0. This model was significant 
(.000), but the Odds Ratio of 1.051 indicates slightly higher than 1 to 1 odds of having increased 





were used to measure resources consumed to conduct the source 
selection. SSMF
3 
asked how many personnel were on the Source Selection team and SSMF
4 
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asked how many there should have been absent a fear of protest. Three tests were run using 
FEAR of protest as the independent variable. The first was a linear regression using SSMF
3 
as 
the dependent variable. This test was significant (.000) with a   coefficient of .010. Thus, as the 
fear of protest increases, so does the number of personnel assigned to a source selection. The 
next test used a binary variable for FEAR of protest labeled FEAR HI/LO, where a respondent 
whose summated FEAR rating was above average was coded as 1, and all others were coded as 
0. SSMF
3 
again was the dependent variable. Again, a linear regression was performed since the 
dependent variable was not binary. This model was also significant (.000), but displayed a higher 
  coefficienct of .149. The last test was a logistic regression using the difference between SSMF3 
and SSMF
4
. Those responses that had more people on the team than the respondent thought 
should be (absent a fear of protest) were coded as 1; all others were coded as 0. This test was not 
significant (.379). 
A series of logistic regressions were then run on the appropriateness of two types of 
source selections—LPTA and Full Trade-Off—using responses from the variables SSMF6 and 
SSMF
8
. The first step in the test was to filter in only the respondents that used the particular 
Source Selection Method (i.e., LPTA or full trade-off). A dummy variable was then created to 
ascertain how appropriate the respondent thought the use of the method was. The questions used 
a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 being “Completely Inappropriate” and 7 being 
“Completely Appropriate.” Respondents that answered the questions with scores of 3 or less 
were coded as 1, and all others were coded as 0. Of note, there were 13 respondents out of 133 
that used LPTA even though they felt it was to some degree inappropriate. 10 respondents out of 
174 that used Full Trade-off even though they felt it was to some degree inappropriate. This 
inappropriate use totals 7.49 percent of the 307 respondents that used either LPTA or trade-off as 
a source selection method. Both tests used the same binary FEAR HI/LO independent variable in 
the aforementioned tests. The logistic regression test to measure the relationship with the use of 
the Full Trade-off inappropriateness was not significant (.181). The test using LPTA 
inappropriateness was significant (.010) with an Odds Ratio of 4.673.  
Three tests were then performed to measure the relationship between the FEAR of protest 










. The first test used the binary 
FEAR HI/LO independent variable to measure the level of satisfaction with the degree of 
discussions, using SSMF
9 
as the dependent variable. SSMF
9 
uses a seven-point Likert-type with 
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1 being “Completely Satisfied” and 7 being “Completely Dissatisfied.” The test was significant 
(.037) with a   coefficient of .382. The test signifies that if FEAR of protest is high, the level of 
dissatisfaction with discussions rises slightly. The next test used the FEAR HI/LO binary 
independent variable and SSMF
10
 as the dependent variable. SSMF
10
 examined how much the 
level of discussions would change if there were no ability to protest. It used a seven-point Likert-
type scale with 1 representing “No Difference” and 7 representing a “Substantial Difference.” 
This test was also significant (.000) with a   of 1.289. The test signifies that respondents with 
high FEAR of protest would change the manner in which they conducted discussions if there 
were no threat of protest. The last test was a Logistic Regression performed on FEAR as the 




 asked whether discussions had been conducted or 
not, and was binary coded where 1 represented Yes and 0 represented No. This test was also 
significant (.037), but the Odds Ratio of 1.030 shows only a slightly better than to 1 odds of 
FEAR having an effect on whether discussions are conducted. Hence, fear of protest tends to 
slightly increase the odds that discussions will occur.  
The next test was a linear regression performed to analyze the appropriateness of oral 
presentations. The test used FEAR as an independent variable and SSMF
15
 as the dependent 
variable. This test did not reject the null hypothesis (.261) that there is no linear relationship 
between the two variables. 
The Awarded Contracts variable (AC) measured the difference between how many 
contracts were planned and how many were actually awarded. The AC variable was binary 
coded where respondents that saw more contracts awarded than planned was coded as 1 and all 
others were 0. There were 19 instances where more contracts were awarded than originally 
planned, representing 5.42 percent of respondents. However, this test was insignificant (.350) 
and no further analysis of this relationship was done. 
Transaction Costs consists of two separate variables comprised of questions measuring 
the number of iterations of key source selection documents (TCI) and personnel costs of those 
associated with the source selection (TCP). Descriptive statistics of the TCI variables are shown 
in Table 33. TCP was calculated by asking respondents the number, rank, and fraction of one 
year’s time spent on the source selection by role. The average 2013 General Schedule annual pay 
was used to calculate the cost for each role, and then summed for each source selection into the 
TCP dependent variable. The values ranged from a low of $7,000.00 to a maximum of 
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$3,551,944.33. The average cost per source selection was $235,236.34, with a standard deviation 
of $291,620.05. Linear regression was used to test the relationship between the independent 
variable, FEAR of protest, and TCP. The test was significant (.018) but displayed a very low   of 
.009. While there was a statistically significant relationship between these two variables, the 
effect size is minute.  
The next series of tests were on the TCI variables. Normality was achieved on only four 
types of source selection documents of many types of documents measured—Source Selection 
Plan, Debriefing Script, Color/Rating Chart, and Evaluation/Briefing Chart to the Source 
Selection Authority. The first test measured the relationship between the independent variable, 
FEAR, and TCI
4
, which represents the number of iterations of the Source Selection Plan. This 
test was shown to be significant (.000), and had a   of .023. The second test measured the 
relationship between the independent variable, FEAR, and TCI
5
, which represents the number of 
iterations of the Debriefing Script. This test was also shown to be significant (.000), and had a   
of .028. The third test measured the relationship between the independent variable, FEAR, and 
TCI
9
, which represents the number of iterations of the Color/Rating Chart. This test was shown 
to be significant (.000), and had a   of .020. Finally, the last test measured the relationship 
between the independent variable, FEAR, and TCI
10
, which represents the number of iterations 
of the Evaluation/Briefing Chart to the Source Selection Authority. This test was shown to be 
significant (.000), and had a   of .018. While there is a significant relationship between FEAR of 
protest and the number of changes to each of these documents, the magnitudes of the 









Table 33.   Document Iteration Descriptive 
Document N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Source selection decision document 350 .00 12.00 2.6429 1.80604 
Comp. assessment/proposal analysis report 350 .00 10.00 2.4743 1.66307 
Evaluation notices  350 .00 21.00 2.3314 2.55796 
Source selection plan 350 .00 12.00 2.7514 2.02093 
Debriefing scripts  350 .00 15.00 1.9657 1.98099 
Technical evaluations  350 .00 17.00 3.4143 2.38244 
Past performance evaluations  350 .00 20.00 2.7486 2.62666 
Cost/Price analysis 350 .00 17.00 2.3086 1.87937 
Color/rating chart 350 .00 11.00 1.3257 1.60128 
Evaluation briefing charts for reviewers and SSA 350 .00 10.00 1.7257 1.61624 
 
The last hypothesized consequence of FEAR to be tested was the effect on contracting 
officer authority. Two tests were performed using CO AUTH as the dependent variable. The first 
test used the binary FEAR HI/LO and the second test used a continuous measure of FEAR (on a 
one to seven scale) as the independent variable. The first test had a significance of .914, which is 
not significant. The second test had a significance of .093 which is considered marginally 
significant using an   value of .10. The   coefficient was -.070, which was in the direction 
hypothesized. 
The object of the final set of tests was to analyze hypothesized relationships between the 
technical evaluations’ effectiveness (TEE) and perceived source selection method 
appropriateness on contractor performance (CP). Multiple regression was used to analyze this 
relationship. The construct TEE and SSMA were used as the independent variables and CP was 
used as the dependent variable. The overall test was significant (.000). TEE was significant as an 
independent variable (.001) and had a   of .327. SSMA was also significant as an independent 
variable (.000) and had a   of .328. This test showed significant relationships between the TEE 
and CP, and between SSMA and CP. The    indicated moderate effect sizes.  
Next, two exploratory tests were performed on the inappropriate use of LPTA as the 
independent variable and contractor performance as the dependent variable. Only the 133 
responses that used LPTA were included in these tests. For the first test, a binary variable was 
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used, in which respondents that felt LPTA was anything other than appropriate (4 or less) were 
coded as 1 and all others were 0. The test showed a significant relationship (.010) between the 
variables, and a   of -4.355 indicating that CP decreases significantly for those respondents that 
felt the use of LPTA was other than appropriate. The second test used the continuous LPTA 
appropriateness scores where 1 represents “completely inappropriate” and 7 represents 
“completely appropriate.” CP was the dependent variable. This test was also significant (.006) 
with a   of 1.237. This shows that as LPTA appropriateness increases by one unit, CP also 
increases by 1.237 (on a seven-point scale). 
The final test was a linear regression to measure the relationship between contractor 
performance and buyer satisfaction. The construct CP was used as the independent variable and 
BS was used as the dependent variable. The test showed a significant (.000) positive relationship 
between the two variables; the magnitude of the   was.285. A summary table of all key 
regression data can be found in Table 34. A visual depiction of all relationships associated with 








Table 34.   Key Statistics from Right-Side (Consequences) Regressions 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable N R2 Adj R2 D.F. Sig.          
FEAR TEE 350 .064 .061 349 .000 -.136 .000 
FEAR PALT Actual** 350 .047 - 349 .000 1.051* .001 
FEAR SSMA 350 .003 .001 349 .275 -.050 .275 
FEAR HI/LO** SSMF6** (LPTA Appropriateness) 133 .048 - 132 .010 4.673* .015 
FEAR HI/LO** SSMF7** (T/O Appropriateness) 174 .010 - 173 .181 .416* .187 
FEAR HI/LO** SSMF9 (Satisfaction w/ discussions) 350 .012 .010 349 .037 .382 .037 
FEAR HI/LO** SSMF10 (Hypothetical change) 350 .100 .097 349 .000 1.289 .000 
FEAR  SSMF12** (Discussions Held Y/N) 350 .012 - 349 .037 1.030* .038 
FEAR  SSMF15 (Oral Pres. Appropriateness) 350 .004 .001 349 .261 -.016 .261 
FEAR  SSMF3 (Resources) 350 .077 .074 349 .000 .010 .000 
FEAR HI/LO** SSMF3 (Resources) 350 .066 .063 349 .000 .149 .000 
FEAR SSMF3** (More Resources than needed) 350 .002 - 349 .378 1.013* .379 
FEAR  TCI 350 .101 .099 349 .000 .014 .000 
FEAR TCI4 (Source Selection Plan) 350 .084 .082 349 .000 .023 .000 
FEAR TCI5 (Debriefing Scripts) 350 .078 .076 349 .000 .028 .000 
FEAR TCI9 (Color/Rating Chart) 350 .038 .035 349 .000 .020 .000 
FEAR TCI10 (Evaluation/Briefing Chart for SSA) 350 .038 .035 349 .000 .018 .000 
FEAR TCP 270 .021 .017 269 .018 .009 .018 
FEAR AC** 350 .002 - 349 .350 1.029* .355 
FEAR CO AUTH 350 .008 .005 349 .093 -.070 .093 
FEAR HI/LO** CO AUTH 350 .000 -.003 349 .914 -.070 .914 
TEE*** CP 350 .123 .118 349 .000 .327 .001 
SSMA*** CP .328 .000 
SSMF6**(LPTA Appr) CP 133 .049 .042 132 .010 -4.355 .010 
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SSMF6 CP 133 .057 .049 132 .006 1.237 .006 
CP BS 350 .442 .441 349 .000 .285 .000 
         










Figure 3.  Right Side of Hypothesized Model 
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Figure 4.  Statistically Significant Model
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H. CONCLUSION  
In summary, this chapter reported the results of the linear, multiple, and logistic 
regressions performed on the 350 usable survey responses. Firstly, the 350 responses 
were analyzed to verify that the data was appropriate for being used in regression analysis 
(i.e., that the assumptions of regression were satisfied). Exploratory Factor Analysis was 
then performed to purify scales, in which 35 items were retained for eight constructs, 
with all constructs being measured by no fewer than three items and exhibiting sufficient 
reliability coefficients (Muir, 2010). Finally, the hypothesized model was analyzed using 
regression analysis. Several relationships were shown to be statistically significant, which 
supported 12 of 14 proposed hypotheses. Lastly, the hypothesized model was presented 
with only the statistically significant relationships shown (Figure 4). For ease of 
interpretation, a summary table containing the significance level of each hypothesis can 






Table 35.   Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1 Insufficient PALT has a direct positive relationship on the level of fear of protest. Yes 
H2 The greater a contracting officer’s Competence level, the lower the level of fear 
of protest. 
Yes 
H3 The level of requirement criticality/importance has a positive impact on the level 
of fear of protest. 
Yes 
H4 As protest risk increases, the level of fear of protest increases. Yes 
H5 The level of fear of protest has a negative effect on the technical evaluation 
effectiveness. 
Yes 
H6 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the Source 
Selection method fit/ appropriateness. 
Partially 
H7 There is a positive correlation between the fit/appropriateness of a source 
selection and contractor performance. 
Partially 
H8 There is a positive relationship between technical evaluation effectiveness and 
contractor performance. 
Yes 
H9 There is a direct positive relationship between contractor’s performance based on 
the source selection method used and the Buyer’s satisfaction. 
Yes 
H10 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the actual 
PALT. 
Yes 
H11 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and the number of 
Human Resources assigned to the source selection team. 
No 
H12 There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and transaction 
costs. 
Yes 
H13 The higher the level of fear of protest, the greater the number of awarded 
contracts. 
No 





V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this research was to address gaps in the literature review and 
offer acquisition leaders, practitioners, and scholars a better understanding of the causes 
and effects of a fear of protest. From this research, acquisition leaders and practitioners 
can better align their internal/external policies, acquisition strategies, and resources to 
mitigate the causes and effects of fear of protest, which ultimately saves money and 
increases customer satisfaction (mission) and contractor performance.  
The existing literature (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2013; 
O’Rourke, 2014), Gordon’s publication (2013), and other publications (Knauth, 2013; 
Maser et al., 2010; Kendall, 2012), were used to identify problems that have not been 
addressed, specifically, the magnitude of fear of protests, the extent that fear of a protest 
affects an acquisition strategy, and the lengths that acquisition professionals would go to 
avoid a protest. These problems, to this point, have been largely anecdotal. This study is 
the first to assess the magnitude of fear of protest, and the first to empirically explore its 
antecedents and consequence.  
To close the gaps in the existing literature, this research addressed the following 
three research questions:  
Research Question 1: Are contracting officers sufficiently concerned about bid 
protests to alter acquisition strategies? 
Research Question 2: If so, what factors affect protest “fear”?  
Research Question 3: What are the consequences to the acquisition strategy and 
contract outcomes? 
Because of the nature of the research questions, it was appropriate to use a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Literature from several 
governmental, public, and private studies and reports were used to develop the conceptual 




Once the data was collected and analyzed from 350 responses that represented a diverse 
population of U.S. Navy contracting officers, regression analysis was performed using 
SPSS Statistics Version 22.0. 
From the statistical analysis, many of the hypotheses had significant relationships. 
Overall, the magnitude of those relationships was relatively small. Among the more 
significant outcomes, the research determined that fear of protest decreases the technical 
evaluation effectiveness, which decreases the contractor’s performance, and ultimately 
decreases buyer satisfaction. Additionally, fear of a protest is linked to inappropriate use 
of the LPTA source selection method, to delays in contract awards, to increased 
transaction costs, and to dissatisfaction with discussions with offerors.  
B. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
In this section, the research results as well as managerial implications are 
discussed. Additionally, the results of the hypothesis testing and regression analysis are 
discussed. The analysis resulted in statistically significant estimates for 10 of the 
hypotheses (Hypotheses 1–10 and 12), marginally significant estimates for one of the 
hypotheses (14), and estimates with no statistical support for two of the hypotheses (11 
and 13) 
This section is organized as follows. First, the question of what is the magnitude 
of fear of protest among U.S. Navy contracting officers was answered and discussed. 
Secondly, each result of hypothesis testing is discussed and explained.  
1. Magnitude of Fear  
A histogram of the values for fear of protest can be found below in Figure 5. The 
left side indicates less fear and the right indicates more. For clarification, 16 respondents 
indicated that they strongly disagreed, indicating a low level of fear, and eight indicated 
that they strongly agreed, indicating a high level of fear.  The combined average response 
that indicates neither agree nor disagree is 19.71 on a possible scale range from five to 
35. This would indicate that, on average, the respondents fell between neither disagree or 
agree. There are, however, many respondents that fear a protest, and this can have an 
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effect on acquisition strategies. Notably, there is a small but distinctly separate contingent 
of respondents (16, or 4.5 percent) who did not fear a protest at all. Consistent with the 
qualitative comments received in the comments field of the survey and in qualitative 
interviews, these strongly-held perspectives may be personal philosophies that protests 
are a natural part of the acquisition process. In other words, why fear what is expected? 
Importantly, this small contingent slightly reduced the average fear, meaning that the 
average of the remainder of the sample would be slightly higher at 20.41. Nonetheless, 
there appears not to be a strong, pervasive problem of a fear of protest within the Navy. 
 
Figure 5.  FEAR Construct Histogram 
A low level of a fear of protest could be explained by a contracting officer’s 
confidence resulting from their experience or in their ability to properly conduct a source 
selection. As one of the interview participants pointed out,  
I am not fearful of a protest because if you protest me and I did it right, what—the 
protest is not going to be sustained, it is going to be denied. So the fear of a protest is 
usually not present other than the delay in the procurement action in case it is an urgent 
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action or something that needs to get in place and time. It may delay the action, there may 
be a stay of some sort, but other than that avoiding a protest—just doing the right thing 
avoids a protest. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that high levels of exposure to something can 
lower the amount of fear one has in it occurring. Out of an average of 13.12 years of 
contracting experience, contracting officers only experienced an average of 1.96 bid 
protests.  
2. Insufficient PALT Planned 
Hypothesis 1: Insufficient PALT has a direct positive relationship on the level of 
fear of protest. 
There is strong evidence that suggests insufficient PALT is a contributor to the 
level of fear of protest. Although the relationship is significant, the coefficient is low. The 
more insufficient the planned procurement lead-time is thought to be, the level of fear of 
a protest increases. Alternatively, when insufficient PALT decreases, the level of fear 
decreases.  
The relationship is very plausible. When acquisition personnel have less planned 
PALT than they believe is necessary to properly conduct the source selection, there is 
less time to adequately follow an acquisition strategy. This insufficient time increases the 
concern of a protest because internal customers and acquisition personnel may 
unnecessarily rush the acquisition process. This relationship is particularly plausible 
when the EOFY is approaching. Customers must obligate their remaining funds before 
the EOFY, September 30, or lose the remaining funds. In some instances, customers 
submit to the contracting agencies their requirements a few days before the EOFY. There 
is little time to adequately complete the acquisition process. 
3. Contracting Officer’s Competence 
Hypothesis 2: The greater a contracting officer’s competence level, the lower the 
level of fear of protest.  
In the examination of a contracting officer’s years of experience as an indicator of 
his or her competence, there was no relationship with a fear of protest. There is strong 
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evidence, however, that a contracting officer’s competence in terms of the number of 
source selections experienced lowers the level of fear of bid protest. The coefficient path 
of -.267 suggests that there is a negative relationship between the contracting officer’s 
source selection participation and the level of a fear of protest. 
It was hypothesized that there would be a relationship with both the years of 
experience and the number of source selections experienced. However, the lack of a 
relationship with regard to years of experience can be explained because of a few likely 
scenarios. Experience in a FAR Part 15 source selection can vary greatly regardless of 
one’s years of experience. Some may have been in the contracting career field for many 
years but have rarely dealt with a FAR Part 15 source selection because they have 
worked mainly post-award contract administration, pre-award simplified acquisitions, or 
are in a mission area whose requirements are mostly sole source procurements such as 
research and development. The number of source selections is a better determinant for 
measuring competence than is years of general contracting experience. The research 
supports that the greater the quantity of FAR Part 15 source selections a contracting 
officer has experienced, the more comfortable they become in their ability to work 
through the proper process and ultimately have less fear of a bid protest.  
The empirical data also did not support the DAWIA certification level as a 
surrogate measure of competence. No relationship between DAWIA certification level 
and fear of protest was found. There can very well be a contracting officer with a level 
two DAWIA certification that has more source selection experience than a level three 
DAWIA certified contracting officer. DAWIA level is not a reliable indicator of 
experience, capability, and therefore, a KO’s confidence in ability.  
It is important for practitioners to understand that competence comes in many 
forms and the person selected for a source selection of importance should not be chosen 
on DIAWA level or years of general contracting experience alone; but they should also 
look at how many source selections the contracting officer has experienced.  
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4. Requirement Criticality/Importance 
Hypothesis 3: The level of requirement criticality/importance has a positive 
impact on the level of fear of protest. 
There is overwhelming evidence that requirement criticality/importance is a 
contributor to the level of fear. The relationship for Hypothesis 3 is statistically 
significant and the path coefficient is positive and fairly strong, Therefore, as the level of 
the requirements critically/importance increases, the level of fear of protest increases. 
There is much more concern and pressure to ensure the customer gets the requested 
requirement in a timely manner when the requirement is critically important to their 
mission. Protests take time and delay the customer’s receipt of his or her required 
products or services. If the requirement is of great importance to the customer, the 
pressure from this importance is felt by the contracting officer. This can increase the 
contracting officer’s level of a fear of protest. Managers should be aware of this and 
ensure that proper planned PALT is built into the acquisition strategy to counter the 
increase of a fear of protest and to ensure enough time for proper peer reviews.  
5. Protest Risk 
Hypothesis 4: As protest risk increases, the level of fear of protest increases. 
There is strong evidence suggesting that protest risk is a contributor to the level of 
fear of protest. The relationship for Hypothesis 4 is statistically significant, and the beta 
coefficient is positive. As the level of undesirable consequences increases, the level of 
fear increases. There is a perception that a bid protest reflects poorly on the contracting 
officer, as demonstrated by the following quote by one of the contracting officers 
interviewed: “‘oh, you got a protest. What did you do wrong?’ kind of thing. I don’t think 
there is validity to that, but I think that sometimes it is looked at, oh so you got a protest 
so maybe they didn’t do something right in there.” Another contracting officer 
interviewed expressed that, “Well, first off is that it reflects poorly on the command. It 
gives the command a bad reputation in terms of being able to follow the source selection 
plan, for example, professionalism of the contract specialist and contracting officers and 
the source selection team and all of the people that contribute to the award decision. 
Secondly, protests they take a lot of time.” 
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On the other hand, in some commands it is considered a career milestone to have 
experience with a protest for promotion to GS-13, as was expressed in our interviews. 
Another common theme throughout our interviews, and as indicated in our survey 
responses, is the increased workload a protest demands. Everyone is busy, and the last 
thing needed is additional work. Furthermore, new requirements do not stop coming just 
because a protest occurred; a protest can significantly increase an already overburdened 
work load.  
There are several consequences to the acquisition strategy and contract outcomes 
as a result of fear. The following hypotheses focus on the results relating to these 
consequences. 
6. Technical Evaluation Effectiveness  
Hypothesis 5: The level of fear of protest has a negative effect on the technical 
evaluations effectiveness. 
As a result of fear, there is statistical evidence that supports a negative effect on 
the effectiveness of technical evaluations. The negative relationship between fear of 
protest and effectiveness of technical evaluations is small, however. The relationship 
suggests that as a person’s level of a fear of protest increased, the effectiveness of the 
technical evaluation decreased. From the research data, on a scale of one to seven with 
one being strongly disagree and seven being strongly agree, responses averaged 4.5 on 
this scale that measured “At least one technical evaluator expressed concern about not 
being able to say what needs to be said in the technical evaluation.” contracting officers 
somewhat agreed with an average of 4.63 on the scale that “At least one technical 
evaluator was concerned that the constraints imposed on their evaluations impeded 
his/her ability to write a meaningful evaluation.” This suggests that the technical 
evaluators do not believe the process is sufficiently optimized. Additionally, on the scale 
for “Upon evaluation of proposals, at least one technical evaluator expressed a need to 
change at least one evaluation criterion or its definition.” The contracting officer 
somewhat agreed with this with an average of 4.53. It is plausible that a contracting 
officer’s fear of protest could lead them to change the wording or the standards of the 
technical evaluations. To a certain degree, without the threat of a bid protest, the quality 
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of the technical evaluation would change. The statistical analysis suggests that the 
effectiveness of the technical evaluations decreases as the level of fear increases.  
7. Source Selection Method Fit/Appropriateness 
Hypothesis 6: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and 
the Source Selection method fit/appropriateness. 
Hypothesis 6 was partially supported and tests were consistent with the 
relationship hypothesized. The hypothesis measured fear of protests effect on both 
perceived Source Selection Method Appropriateness and on multiple aspects of the 
source selection strategy. The relationship between fear of protests and source selection 
method appropriateness was not supported. The appropriateness construct consisted of 
questions relating to the acquisition strategy used on the particular source selection. 
Acquisition strategy is a broad topic that encompasses decisions made by various 
stakeholders early on in the process of fulfilling a requirement. It is plausible that these 
decisions are made so early that the factors that contribute to fear of protest have not been 
solidified. 
Several relationships between fear of protest and various aspects of the source 
selection strategy were found, however perhaps the most telling evidence of the 
deleterious effects that fear of protest was its impact on LPTA inappropriateness. 
Significant findings included 
 Method inappropriateness—While it represents only 7.5 percent of the 
respondents that used either LPTA or trade-off methods, it must be noted 
that 23 respondents used a source selection method that they felt was to 
some degree inappropriate. The relationship between fear of protests and 
the inappropriate use of LPTA was significant. The results show that 
practitioners with high fear of protests are four times more likely to 
inappropriately use LPTA.  
 Negative effects on satisfaction with discussions—significant relationships 
were found between fear of protests and satisfaction with discussions. 
When fear of protests exists, the level of satisfaction to freely and openly 
conduct discussions with an offeror diminishes. While the effects were 
marginal, the mere existence of this relationship is significant. When 




discussions if there were no ability to protest, the results were also 
significant. The results indicated there would be a distinct change in 
discussions if the protest system did not exist. 
The negative effects that the fear of protest has on source selection decision-
making can be seen most in the variables measured to test this hypothesis. Contracting 
professionals are trained and trusted to make decisions that support the best interest of the 
government. It was statistically shown that fear of protests does have a negative effect on 
acquisition strategy decisions. However, it must be noted that the magnitudes of effects is 
not substantial. 
8. Contractor Performance 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between the fit/appropriateness of a 
source selection and contractor performance. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between technical evaluation 
effectiveness and contractor performance. 
Although source selection method appropriateness was not statistically significant 
in its relationship with fear of a protest, Hypothesis 7 was significant. There is a positive 
relationship between perceived source selection method appropriateness and contractor 
performance. As acquisition strategies are properly tailored to fit requirements, contractor 
performance tends to increase as a result. In assessing source selection method 
appropriateness, survey respondents were prompted to consider the buying situation (e.g., 
complexity, dollar value, acquisition objectives, contract length, performance risk, 
criticality to the mission, availability of supply, time available to award a contract, etc.). 
They were also asked to rate how well the strategy would achieve the acquisition 
objectives and how well the strategy would help select the best offeror.  
Hypothesis 8 was also statistically significant. As the effectiveness of technical 
evaluations increases, so does the contractor performance. Hence, as more effective 
technical evaluations are generated, the more apt the source selection team is to select the 
contractor(s) that can perform the work well. The contractor that has the best value to the 
government is selected for the requirement, which will ultimately lead to greater 
contractor performance. 
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9. Buyer Satisfaction 
Hypothesis 9: There is a direct positive relationship between contractor’s 
performance based on the source selection method used and the Buyer’s 
satisfaction. 
There is overwhelming evidence that suggest that the contractor’s performance 
contributes to an increase in the buyer’s satisfaction. The relationship suggests that, as a 
contractor’s performance increases, buyer’s satisfaction increases. The contracting 
officer’s responsiveness and willingness to address the concerns of the customer can lead 
to a better suited acquisition strategy and have a positive effect on customer satisfaction. 
The contracting officer is working on behalf of the customer and the customer is the 
lifeblood of the contracting activity. It is in the best interest of the contracting activity to 
ensure proper contract performance by using the appropriate contract vehicle, source 
selection method, and overall acquisition strategy. This will, in turn, improve customer 
satisfaction and increase their public value to the taxpayer. Therefore, it is imperative for 
contracting officers to select the appropriate source selection method to choose the best 
Contractor to satisfy the buyer’s requirements and expectations.   
10. PALT Actual 
Hypothesis 10: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and 
the actual PALT. 
There is statistical evidence that suggests that a fear of protest contributes to an 
increase in actual PALT. The data suggests that there is a slightly greater than 50 percent 
chance that the actual PALT will increase as a result of fear of protest. If contracting 
officers are concerned about a protest, then they will spend more time to justify their 
decisions. They could seek assistance from other acquisition personnel for their opinion 
and recommendations, which can increase actual PALT. They can also refer to their legal 
advisors and supervisors who likely recommend additional steps or reworked documents 
that, in turn, ultimately increasing actual PALT. From the data, the average PALT 
planned was 182.97 days (6.09 months). The average actual PALT was 236.72 days (7.89 
months). The difference is 53.75 days (1.79 months). Added time is added money (i.e., 
transaction costs). Thus, efficiency is compromised with greater fear of protest. The data 
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suggests that some of this additional time can be attributed to a fear of protest. Although 
not tested, this can have an effect of customer satisfaction and delay mission capabilities.  
11. Resources 
Hypothesis 11: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and 
the number of Human Resources assigned to the source selection team. 
There is statistical evidence that supports a direct positive relationship between 
protest fear and the number of personnel assigned to the source selection team (boards, 
contracting team, price analysis team, past performance team, legal team, and technical 
evaluation team). Additionally, the research data captures an average of 8.96 people are 
on the source selection team. Without the risk of protest, contracting officers believe that 
an average of 7.65 people should have been on the source selection team. The difference 
is 1.33 people. Additionally, 110 survey respondents indicated that they had more people 
than what they believed was needed. More people translate into more transaction costs. 
The results suggest that at least one person too many is assigned. Perhaps more attention 
is needed to not over-staff teams thereby avoid wasted resources. Additionally, if fear of 
protest can be reduced, team size can be reduced and transaction costs can be avoided. 
While these salary costs may be dismissed as sunk costs, certainly excess personnel could 
accomplish other pertinent work if not serving on the source selection team.  
12. Transaction Costs 
Hypothesis 12: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest and 
transaction costs. 
There is strong evidence that a fear of protest causes a small increase in 
transaction cost. The average cost per transaction was $235,236 with a standard deviation 
of $291,620. The research also uncovered that for every dollar awarded in a source 
selection there is an average of 0.08 cents in personnel cost. Without a known 
benchmark, it is difficult to generalize the magnitude of these costs.  
As the level of fear of a protest increase, the cost devoted to the source selection 
process increases as well. Furthermore, as the fear of a protest increases, so do the 
iterations of common source selection documents. The data showed that a fear of protest 
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directly caused a small increase in the amount of iterations of the following documents: 
source selection plan, debriefing scripts, color and rating charts, and evaluation 
debriefing charts. These documents must be completed and reviewed by human capital 
costing additional time and money devoted to a source selection. We found very little 
qualitative evidence that transaction costs were of any concern to interview informants. 
The maxim appears to be to defend the acquisition against a protest no matter the cost in 
terms of time and effort. 
13. Number of Awarded Contracts 
Hypothesis 13: The higher the level of fear of protest, the greater the number of 
awarded contracts. 
There is no statistical evidence to suggest that the higher the level of fear, the 
greater the number of awarded contracts. From the data, contracting officers are awarding 
about the same amount of contracts that they planned. An average of 2.24 contracts was 
planned. An average of 2.39 contracts was awarded. There is a small difference of 0.15, 
but our data suggests that fear is not a factor in the number of awarded contracts. As 
reported in the trade literature, there are instances of awarding more contracts in order to 
thwart a specific protest, but this practice appears not to be pervasive. 
14. Contracting Officer Authority 
Hypothesis 14: There is a direct negative relationship between fear of protest and 
the contracting officer’s authority. 
Although the statistical evidence is marginally significant, there is some evidence 
that fear of protest diminishes contracting officers’ authority (i.e., discretion in making 
decisions).  
This relationship has plausibility. As contracting officers are more concerned 
about a protest, they seek assistance in avoiding a protest, which could diminish their 
discretion in making decisions. If a contracting officer goes to the legal advisor, Legal 
could influence the contracting officer’s decision through their legal opinion and 
recommendations. Often, Legal and committee advisors will be conservative and  
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recommend wording changes to documents, changes to ratings, amendments to the RFP 
and subsequent invitations for revised proposals, and/or further discussions to clear up 
any uncertainty in evaluations.  
Additionally, if a contracting officer has a high level of fear of protest, other 
acquisition team members likely do as well. A high concern of a protest could cause 
others not to empower, trust, or support the contracting officer with making the required 
decisions, which could diminish a Contracting officer’s discretion in making decisions. 
During the interviews, it appeared that the level of which the contracting officer felt 
compelled to take the advice of legal as “gospel” depended on the contracting officer. 
Some felt as though they were compelled to take the advice of legal and some felt it was 
within their discretion to do what they, as the contracting, thought was the best course of 
action.  
It is ultimately obviously the contracting officer’s decision and it basically 
depends on what their comfort level is in terms of some won’t turn their head without 
getting an opinion from legal and making sure that they sign off on it and other ones 
basically believe—and I agree—that legal is an advisory role, obviously. 
 It has been noted during our interviews that the legal department is the most 
concerned about a protest. This makes sense since they will carry a lot of the work 
involved in a protest if received. It has also been stated in our interviews that legal 
advocates for a LPTA source selection methodology. Since our data suggests that there is 
a very weak negative relationship with a fear of protest and contracting officer’s 
authority, we can infer that the contracting officers are not unnecessarily influenced by 
legal, but there were 13 cases in our 350 respondents in which the contracting officer 
chose LPTA even though they believed it was not the best course of action.  
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Research Question 1: Are Contracting Officers Sufficiently 
Concerned about Bid Protests to Alter Acquisition Strategies?  
The answer to this research question is “yes.” U.S. Navy contracting officers 
change aspects of acquisition strategies to avoid a protest. However, U.S. Navy 
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contracting officers appear not to be overly concerned about a bid protests. The concerns 
of protest exist, but overall the magnitude is not excessive. There is little evidence from 
the research suggesting that contracting officers drastically alter acquisition strategies to 
avoid a protest.  
There is evidence to suggest that a fear of protest can alter an acquisition strategy. 
The 350 survey respondents, who have an average of 13.12 years of contracting 
experience, were asked throughout their career, how many times they have awarded a 
task/delivery order against an IDIQ contract (or Blanket Purchase Agreement [BPA]) in 
order to avoid a bid protest. The data shows that 88 respondents had done so throughout 
their career with 4,139 contracting actions. It was also shown that 67 respondents avoided 
a protest using a sole source award throughout their career in order to (1011 contracting 
actions) and 80 respondents had modified an existing contract throughout their career in 
order to avoid a protestable competitive procurement (1,065 contracting action). With 
350 respondents that have an average of 13.12 years of experience, this equals 4,784.5 
years of total experience. The total contracting actions from the three previously 
discussed survey questions totals 6,215. This is just under 1.3 redirected contracting 
actions per year of experience. There are consequences of a fear of protest that our 
research revealed. These consequences are discussed in research question three.  
2. Research Question 2: If So, What Factors Affect Protest “Fear”?  
Based on the regression model, insufficient PALT, protest risk, the number of 
source selections a contracting officer previously experienced, and the requirement 
criticality/importance are the factors that affect a fear of protest. Neither a Contracting 
officer’s years of contracting experience nor their DAWIA certification level affected the 
fear of protest.  
3. Research Question 3: What are the Consequences to the Acquisition 
Strategy and Contract Outcomes? 
Based on the significant levels, a fear of protest can have negative consequences 
on the effectiveness of technical evaluations leading to a decrease in contractor 
performance and, in turn, buyer satisfaction. An increase of fear of protest has a negative 
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effect on technical evaluations effectiveness. Technical evaluation effectiveness has a 
positive influence on contractor performance which, in turn, is positively related to buyer 
satisfaction. Technical evaluation effectiveness considered elements such as (a) being 
able to say what needs to be said, (b) being able to write a meaningful evaluation, and (c) 
a need to change an evaluation factor or its definition.  
The perceived appropriateness of the source selection method will also have a 
positive impact on contractor performance. The more appropriate the source selection 
method used, the higher the contractor performance leading to greater buyer satisfaction. 
A notable finding from this research is that the inappropriate use of LPTA was shown to 
have a substantial negative impact on contractor performance.  
Actual PALT can increase as a result of a fear of protest. The research data 
revealed that there is a 50 percent chance that PALT will increase as a result of fear. 
Thus, efficiency is compromised with greater fear of protest. The data suggests that some 
of this additional time can be attributed to a fear of protest. Although not tested, this can 
have an effect of customer satisfaction and delay mission capabilities.  
Contracting officers perceive their authority to decrease as their fear of protest 
increases. A plausible explanation can be that as contracting officers are more concerned 
about a protest; they seek assistance in avoiding a protest, which could diminish their 
discretion in making decisions. Additionally, a high concern of a protest could cause 
others not to empower, trust, or support the contracting officer with making the required 
decisions, which could diminish a contracting officer’s discretion in making decisions.  
Fear of protest also has a negative impact on the level of satisfaction with 
discussions. As fear increases, the contracting officer’s satisfaction with discussions 
decreases. This is an indicator of suboptimal discussion that could have implications for 
the awarded contract and, more importantly, contractor performance. Another 
consequence of a fear of protest is the transaction cost and time associated with the 




such as source selection plan, debriefing scripts, color and rating charts, and evaluation 
debriefing charts. This can lead to additional time and money (i.e., opportunity costs) 
spent on the requirement. 
D. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS  
This section discusses some of the possible implications this study revealed and 
what managers and practitioners can learn from them. As discussed earlier, the magnitude 
of fear of protest does not appear to be a pervasive problem within the Navy’s contracting 
community, but there are many contracting officers that allow this fear to affect elements 
of their acquisition strategy. There were 23 survey respondents (7.49 percent) that 
revealed that the source selection method used was to some degree inappropriate. While 
this proportion appears insignificant, it can be argued that any single instance of an 
inappropriate source selection method gives room for pause to see what is driving this 
inappropriateness. As mentioned by an interview participant, “I will tell you, legal pushes 
the LPTA. They push it a lot.” Another interviewee mentioned. At this juncture, there are 
too many hands in the soup, and the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) authority has 
been diminished. Attorneys need to resume the role of counselors again. Fear of protests 
does not generate good contracts, or in this case can prevent any award from being made. 
Recommendation 1: Agencies should foster a culture that empowers the 
contracting officer to perform the job they are trained to accomplish. 
Since the source selection method is not a matter of legal sufficiency, Legal 
should not determine the source selection method used, nor should they encourage any 
particular source selection method such as LPTA. Selecting the source selection method 
is a contracting officer’s decision based on experience, knowledge, and professional 
judgment; contracting officers should feel empowered and should in no way be 
influenced against their better judgment. Otherwise, Federal Government agencies may 
have a professional field with a high degree of accountability but subtly-diminished 
authority. Acquisition leaders should reassure their contracting officers that they have the 
ultimate say in the source selection method employed, and that legal’s role is to advise 
and to clarify the many legal issues that contracting within the government entails. If the 
contracting officer does not have the authority or believes that the legal department has 
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the ultimate say, it would be less expensive to the government to hire clerks or paralegals 
to accomplish the contracting mission. The judgment of the contracting officer, the 
person actually signing the contract, should be respected by management and 
management should encourage a culture that empowers the contracting officer. 
Undue influence from management can also lead to an inappropriate source 
selection method. There is pressure applied to management to reduce their unit’s average 
time for procurements. This can lead to pressure from management to the contracting 
officer resulting in the overuse of LPTA. Management should resist this pressure. Our 
data suggests that LPTA inappropriateness can have a negative effect on contractor 
performance that leads to less buyer satisfaction. Ultimately the best course of action is to 
use the source selection method that best suits the requirement.  
Recommendation 2: Agencies should establish a standard policy for PALT based 
on dollar value and source selection method. 
Planned PALT is often a result of the internal customer’s situation. It may be a 
requirement that is needed within three weeks or three months, but most everyone wants 
their requirement fulfilled as quickly as possible. It is important that the contracting 
officer has the ability to manage the expectations of the customer and that the contracting 
officer’s management supports them on this issue. If planned PALT is less than what the 
contracting officer believes to be sufficient, there are implications that a fear of a protest 
will increase. This, in turn, can ultimately have a negative effect on technical evaluation 
effectiveness and ultimately on the contractor’s performance. A possible solution to this 
is to have an instruction that sets PALT by dollar value and by source selection method. 
A higher dollar requirement that is best procured using a trade-off approach will take 
more time and should be built in to the planned PALT. The contracting officer should 
have the flexibility to deviate from these predetermined PALT’s based on their 
experience and judgment.  
Recommendation 3: Agencies should establish a training program to supplement 
FAR Part 15 source selection experience. 
The competence level of the contracting officer is validly measured in terms of 
the number of source selections experienced (and not raw years of contracting experience 
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or DAWIA certification level). As the number of source selections conducted increases, 
the level of fear of protest decreases. Therefore, efforts should be made to increase the 
number of source selections experienced by contracting officers. Of the 350 survey 
respondents, it was found that the average years of experience are 13.12 with an average 
of 18.31 source selection participations. That is just under 1.40 source selections a year. 
There is no equal alternative to on-the-job-training (OJT), but source selection 
simulations and scenario-based training could be utilized as an alternative and as a 
supplement to OJT. If the acquisition community is relying solely on OJT, it can take a 
contracting officer far too long to gain an adequate level of competence with FAR Part 15 
source selections. In addition, when selecting a contracting officer for a source selection, 
it is important to realize that years of contracting experience and DAWIA certification 
level do not represent his or her level of competence.  
As criticality and importance of the requirement increases, so does the contracting 
officer’s level of a fear of protest. As fear increases, buyer satisfaction can be negatively 
altered through the inappropriate use of source selection methods and the level at which 
they effectively communicate with the offerors. Therefore, the criticality and importance 
of the requirement should be taken into account when assigning a contracting officer to 
serve as the PCO for the source selection. Perhaps a PCO with greater source selection 
experience (i.e., which lowers fear of protest) can offset the higher fear of protest 
associated with more critical requirements. 
As a fear of protest increases, the effectiveness of technical evaluations decreases. 
Recall that this construct encapsulated situations where technical evaluators expressed 
concerns that (a) they did not have the latitude to say what needed to be said in their 
evaluations, (b) constraints impeded the ability to write a meaningful evaluation, and (c) 
an evaluation factor or its definition needed to be changed after receipt of proposals. This 
should be cause for alarm since the purpose of a source selection is to attain a needed 
performance level outcome at a reasonable price/cost while mitigating risk. Technical 
evaluators via the contracting officer should have the latitude and the freedom to halt a 
source selection to ensure the customer and the tax payer are getting the best contracted 
outcome (i.e. value) for the invested dollars; though this recommendation is time 
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consuming and is often not an option. Evaluators, however, can reduce the risk of this 
occurring by becoming part of the crafting of Section M criteria. Is a FAR Part 15 full 
trade-off source selection too cumbersome to ensure we are getting the best requirement 
outcome? Is the transaction cost of full trade off too high? It may be that the acquisition 
rules on evaluations and the protest implications of them are too strict and FAR part 15 
may need another reevaluation to allow for more flexibility. Our research suggests that as 
a contracting officer’s fear of a protest increases, there is a decrease in technical 
evaluation effectiveness leading to a decrease in contractor performance and less buyer 
satisfaction.   
Recommendation 4: The DAU should establish a prerequisite online training 
program for technical evaluation team members. 
Additional training for the technical evaluators and for the technical evaluation 
team is required to increase their level of competence within the evaluation process. The 
evaluation process has many people that are not necessarily familiar with the rules that 
govern this process, and it is ultimately the responsibility of the contracting officer to 
ensure that the technical team is aware and its members are sufficiently trained to handle 
the evaluation process. The contracting officer should not be solely responsible to train 
the technical evaluators, and all people involved in the process should have a minimum 
training requirement that educates them on the process. All members involved in the 
technical evaluation process should have a minimum uniform standard of training. A 
DOD or a DAWIA certification could give the contracting officer the confidence that the 
technical evaluation team has the proper level of knowledge to carry out the evaluation 
function. If the contracting officer is comfortable with the level of knowledge then he or 
she can focus on guiding and advising the technical evaluators and spend less time 
elevating their baseline knowledge of the process. This can reduce the fear a contracting 
officer has of a protest and increase the effectiveness of technical evaluations. This can, 
in turn, lead to increased contractor performance and buyer satisfaction. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
This study had several limitations. First, this study was limited to the Navy’s 
acquisition workforce. Thus, while the fear of a protest phenomenon has been discussed 
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in the context of all Federal contracting, these study results may not be generalized 
beyond the U.S. Navy. Respondents were asked to answer questions that reflected only 
their most recent completed FAR Part 15 source selection above $150,000 in which they 
participated. On certain questions, respondents provided estimated responses. For 
example, a respondent stated that a GS-15 Supervisor spend about 10 percent of one 
year’s time dedicated to the source selection. It may be difficult to for respondents to 
estimate accurate times; therefore, these estimated responses may not be precise. 
However, these estimates were useful in establishing a benchmark to understand the 
monetary cost incurred to avoid a protest. Activity-based costing using a database (i.e., 
the Navy’s Standard Labor Data Collection and Distribution Application( SLDCADA)) 
to retrieve data that captured the amount of time a government employee worked on a 
particular source selection could reveal a more accurate monetary cost to avoid a protest.  
Additionally, contracting officers might not have a true sense of buyer 
satisfaction. Customers (end-users) may not share their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
a Contractor to the contracting officer unless there are significant problems. If the 
problems are minor and can be worked out with the contracting officer representatives 
(COR) or customer, the contracting officer might not have knowledge of the situation. 
Secondly, this research was exploratory. The survey length was a chief concern, which 
we suspect resulted in a low response rate. Some of the acquisition strategy variables 
relied on single indicators (e.g., dissatisfaction with discussions, appropriateness of 
source selection method and etc.) Finally, the responses from the survey were subjected 
to the problems associated with self-reports in organizational research such as common 
method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research only focused on a few factors associated with fear of protest. 
According to the models’ low adjusted R-square values; there are other, unexplored 




research was not able to examine all possible factors. Therefore, it is recommended that 
future research in the below areas be done to enhance our understanding of the causes 
and effects of a fear of protest. 
1. Risk Tolerance  
There could be a relationship between a person’s level of risk tolerance and the 
level of fear. If a person is risk-averse, that person will do certain actions to reduce the 
risk. In terms of a protest, a risk-averse person may have more concern of a protest. It is 
possible that the risk averse person would change the uncertainty of having a protest to 
the certainty of not having a protest. If a person has a high risk tolerance, then that person 
is willing to accept risks. That person might not be as concerned about a protest. A 
protest to that person “is the cost of doing business.” Agencies should balance a person’s 
level of risk tolerance against the procurement. Agencies can lower transaction costs by 
accepting more risk and by assessing the risk tolerance of the team members to ensure 
appropriate risk comfort levels are appropriate for the requirement. If the procurement 
has a low risk of protest, a high-risk tolerance person should handle the procurement. The 
same is true for procurement with a high risk of protest; a risk-averse person should 
handle the procurement. The risk-averse person could take the extra time and resources to 
ensure the source selection is sound.  
2. Previous Experience with a Protest 
Fear is a natural reaction to an unknown threat. From the data, contracting officers 
have experienced only an average of 1.96 protests throughout their career. Many 
contracting officers never experience a protest. Contracting officers understand the 
general repercussions of a protest through press accounts, GAO reports, and interaction 
with those who have experienced one. When contracting officers experience a protest, 
their view of the protest process can change. It is a logical conclusion that if a contracting 
officer has experience with protest, they may be less fearful of a protest. However, it is 
possible that having experienced a protest, the contracting officer might be more inclined 
to alter acquisition strategies to avoid the painful experience of additional work, shame, 
and career repercussions. The implication is for agencies to ensure their contracting 
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officers have personal experience in dealing with a protest. Requiring contracting officers 
to have personal experience could be a difficult task because the rational thought is to 
prevent a protest from happening. If an agency has a protest, the contracting officers with 
more experience of a bid protest should actively mentor and engage less experience 
contracting officers in the protest adjudication process. Instead of having solely the 
experienced contracting officer, or the assigned procuring contracting officer, other 
contracting personnel could be engaged in the protest as well. This mentorship could be 
structured as an apprenticeship. Further, given the way the internet can close the 
geographic divide, apprentice contracting personnel could be involved regardless of 
physical separation from the protested contracting activity. The additional contracting 
personnel on the protest adds additional cost, but the benefit of gaining firsthand 
knowledge and experience could outweigh the costs for the agency. Currently, 
government agencies—more specifically, contracting activities within them—generate a 
plethora of source selection experience. However, that experience is not systematically 
leveraged to more quickly build more vast competence among the entire contracting 
workforce. Is there a way to learn from others’ mistakes, thereby averting repeats?  
3. Inappropriate Source Selection Method  
There could be numerous reasons why source selection teams used source 
selection methods that were perceived to be inappropriate. The data shows that 13 out of 
133 respondents reported that their use of LPTA was to some degree inappropriate. 
Additionally, 10 respondents out of 174 reported that their use of a full trade-off was to 
some degree inappropriate. Additional research is needed to narrow down the specific 
causes of the inappropriateness of the source selection method. It could have been solely 
because of fear of protest, time constraints, guidance from senior management on the best 
source selection to use for that particular procurement, or a combination thereof. There is 
the possibility that the contracting officer’s personal perspective could have played a role 
in determining whether the source selection used was appropriate or not. If there are 




inappropriately, agencies should explore and implement measures to reduce the 
circumstances that contribute to inappropriate use. Possible reasons for inappropriate use 
are: 
 To avoid a protest 
 To avoid high transaction costs associated with a full trade-off 
 Lack of experience with full trade-offs 
 A lack of understanding of the true complexity of the requirement 
If some of the aforementioned reasons are why inappropriate source selections are 
used, this could be fuel for further reform FAR Part 15. Perhaps strict rules are 
dissuading source selection teams from using the most valuable sourcing tool available to 
them (i.e., full trade-off). Perhaps the complexity of discussions causes source selection 
teams to forego gaining further insight into offerors’ proposals.  
4. Awarding on Initial Proposals 
According to Mr. Gordon, “Contracting officers prefer to make award based on 
initial proposals, rather than to conduct discussions, because they fear that discussions 
with offerors are a legal minefield, such that conducting discussions will increase the 
likelihood of a bid protest and improve the protester’s chances of prevailing if a protest is 
filed.” (Gordon, 2013, p. 37) This research did not examine the likelihood, significance, 
or magnitude of the relationship between fear of protest and award of contracts based on 
the initial proposal. Awarding contracts based on initial proposals could have secondary 
and tertiary effects. There could be a significant link between fear of protest to awarding 
contracts from initial proposals. That link could extend to the source selection method fit, 
and then to the Contractor Performance, which could ultimately have an effect on buyer’s 
satisfaction. If there is a significant relationship of fear of protest and the award of initial 
proposals, then contracting agencies should reduce the practice because discussions are 
beneficial to the contractor and the agency, which would be beneficial to the buyer.  
G. SUMMARY  
In conclusion, fear of the real or perceived consequences of receiving a bid protest 
exists. U.S. Navy contracting officers have some concern of protests due and this can be 
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linked to certain consequences on acquisition strategies. However, the fear of protest 
appears not to be a substantial issue in the Navy. Across five survey questions, the 
average score was a 4.08 (just beyond the middle) on a one to seven point scale. The 
score would indicate that, on average, the respondents fell between neither “disagree nor 
agree” and “somewhat agree.” There are, however, instances where aspects of acquisition 
strategies are altered and this behavior is statistically linked to the fear of protest. Given 
the low r-squared values, however, factors other than a fear of protest are also culprits. 
Further research is needed to ascertain these other culprits, then compare the relative 
effects of fear of protest among other factors. Nonetheless, there is enough qualitative 
and quantitative empirical evidence to suggest that fear of protest can impact what would 
otherwise be prudent business decisions. The greatest concerns are a few instances of 
inappropriate uses of LPTA and the reduced technical evaluation effectiveness attributed 
to fear of protests. If fear waters down the source selection, hindering its ability to 
distinguish between the true value of offers, then contracting officers must ask 
themselves why go through the trouble of a best-value source selection? Could 
contracting officers simply award to the low bidder? To what extent is the set of stringent 
source selection rules driving the acquisition team to this result by default (i.e., regardless 
of source selection method actually employed)? Thus, for the sake of stringent, fairness-
based rules, contracted outcomes can be compromised. Whether the tradeoff is prudent 
remains to be determined. Further research is needed to ascertain these other culprits, 
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You have been randomly selected to participate in a study of bid Protests. This research is 
approved by Mr. Elliot Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition 
and Procurement, and will help us fulfill graduation requirements for our MBA degree. 
  The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of potential bid protests on acquisition 
strategies. I respectfully request your assistance to complete the web-based survey 
located at the hyperlink below. Your participation is completely anonymous. 
  For your time, you will be eligible to enter a random drawing for a new iPad Mini, 
16 GB. To enter, follow the instructions at the end of the survey. 
Survey Link: https://survey.nps.edu/714497/lang-en 
 Your participation is voluntary; however, responses are vital to conducting valid 
research that represents your knowledge and experience. Please complete the survey no 
later than 15 FEB 2014. The survey should take no longer than 30 minutes to complete. 
  We very much appreciate any assistance you can provide. We would be more than 
happy to share our findings with you once we complete our research. If you have any 
questions or comments, please feel free to contact myself at jdcaland@nps.edu , or my 
Principle Advisor, Lt. Col. Timothy Hawkins, PH.D., USAF at 
timothy.hawkins@wku.edu . Questions about your rights as a research subject may be 




LCDR Suquon Combs, LT Jason Calandruccio, LT Brian Colbert 
MBA Students, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Principle Advisor: Lt. Col. Timothy Hawkins, PH.D., USAF 
Advisor: E. Cory Yoder, Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School. 
************************************************************************
******* 
This research is being conducted through the Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy. The questionnaire is anonymous; your responses 
cannot be linked to you. There are not necessarily “right answers.” 
 




Synopsis. This is both an anonymous and voluntary questionnaire. (Please note, in order 
to obtain consistent and usable results, it is important that you answer all questions). It 
will take most respondents approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
 
Risks and Benefits. Your participation in this research poses no known risk. You will be 
asked questions pertaining to the latest source selection in which you participated. There 
will be no personal benefits beyond having contributed your expertise to this important 
research. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to 
unauthorized persons; however, there is minor risk that data collected could be 
mismanaged. If desired, you may contact the researcher above if you would like to 
receive a report of the results of the study. 
 
Confidentiality and Privacy Act. All records of this study will be kept confidential and, 
since responses are anonymous, your privacy will not be at risk. No information will be 
publicly accessible which could identify you as a participant. Responses will be 
maintained by NPS for ten years, after which they will be destroyed. 
By taking this survey, I am acknowledging that I have read and understand this 
information, that I understand the nature and purpose of this study, including its risks and 
benefits, and that I agree to voluntarily participate in this online survey. I also understand 
that I may discontinue at any time simply by exiting this website. 



























Dear Sir or Ma’am,  
 
We recently invited you to participate in a research study of bid protest conducted 
by the Naval Postgraduate School. We regret to inform you that a raffle for an iPad Mini 
will not occur due to ethics regulation constraints offered by supplemental legal advice. 
The research will proceed, and if you have not had a chance to participate, please 
consider offering your expertise.  
 
Survey Link: https://survey.nps.edu/714497/lang-en 
 
Thank you and we apologize for any inconvenience. 
 
V/R 
LCDR Suquon Combs, LT Jason Calandruccio, LT Brian Colbert 
MBA Students, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Principle Advisor: Lt. Col. Timothy Hawkins, PH.D., USAF 





















Thank you for your participating in our research study. We need several more 
responses to achieve the required response rate. For those of you who have not been able 
to respond just yet, please take a few minutes and complete the survey. For those of you, 
who have already responded, thank you much! 
 
If you have not served as a Contracting officer or contract specialist on a FAR 
Part 15 source selection, please reply and let me know. I will remove you from the list. 
This will improve the accuracy of our response rate. 
 
As a reminder, we are conducting a study examining the effects of potential bid 
protests. In appreciation of your participation, I will be happy to send you a brief of the 
study results. Just reply to this message to request the summary report. Again, this report 
will contain descriptive statistics based on collective responses of all participating 
organizations; no individual response data will be published. Your response will be 
completely anonymous. None of the information put in the survey can be traced back to 
any individual nor to any organization. Thank you for assisting us in this valuable study 
required for the completion of my degree at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
To access the online survey, please click the following link: 






















We apologize for not providing a link in our previous e-mail. Your support is greatly 
appreciated. 
To access the online survey, please click the following link: 
  
https://survey.nps.edu/714497/lang-en (or copy and paste to your Web browser.) 
We still require several more responses for our survey to achieve a desired response rate 
for our Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Procurement) sponsored 
Naval Postgraduate School MBA Graduate project. If you have not had an opportunity 
yet, it is not too late. The survey has been extended to March 11. It takes about 30 
minutes and will not only aid in our graduate requirements, but will further our collective 
understanding of our contracting workforce. If you would like a copy of our research, we 
would be more than happy to provide this to you once completed. Just send an e-mail to 
jdcaland@nps.edu or reply to this e-mail and we will ensure you are on the list to receive 
it. For those of you, who have already responded, thank you much! 
 
If you will not be able to respond, please let us know why. This may make our response 
rate more accurate. Also, please inform us if you are not a Contracting officer or 
specialist with experience in at least one FAR Part 15 source selection; we need to 
remove you from the distribution list. 
 Very Respectfully, 
 
 LCDR Suquon Combs, SC, USN 
LT Jason Calandruccio, SC, USN 
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APPENDIX C. ENDORSEMENT BY DASN (AP) 
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APPENDIX D. REGRESSION OUTPUT FROM SPSS VER 22 
 
 




















a. Dependent Variable: FEAR 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .361a .131 .115 7.319 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Source Selections, 
Protest Risk, Dollar Value, Requirement Criticality, PALT 










Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2759.668 6 459.945 8.587 .000b 
Residual 18373.021 343 53.566   
Total 21132.689 349    
a. Dependent Variable: FEAR 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Source Selections, Protest Risk, Dollar Value, 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 10.995 2.852  3.856 .000 
PALT Planned -.259 .091 -.150 -2.862 .004 
Dollar Value .721 .238 .155 3.032 .003 
Requirement 
Criticality 
.431 .135 .167 3.183 .002 
Protest Risk .374 .171 .116 2.190 .029 
Years of 
Experience 
.037 .042 .049 .881 .379 
Number of 
Source Selections 
-.267 .104 -.142 -2.558 .011 




































Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .253a .064 .061 4.046 






Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 390.783 1 390.783 23.869 .000b 
Residual 5697.434 348 16.372   
Total 6088.217 349    
a. Dependent Variable: Technical Evaluation Effectiveness 









Logistic Regression FEAR to PALT Actual 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in 
Analysis 
350 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 



















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 16.343 .590  27.719 .000 
FEAR -.136 .028 -.253 -4.886 .000 







 PALT_ACTUAL Percentage 
Correct  .000 1.000 
Step 0 PALT_ACTUA
L 
.000 0 145 .0 
1.000 0 205 100.0 
Overall Percentage   58.6 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .346 .109 10.184 1 .001 1.414 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR 12.318 1 .000 








Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 12.454 1 .000 
Block 12.454 1 .000 












1 462.412a .035 .047 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 






 PALT_ACTUAL Percentage 
Correct  .000 1.000 
Step 1 PALT_ACTUA
L 
.000 39 106 26.9 
1.000 35 170 82.9 
Overall Percentage   59.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
PALT_ACTUAL = .000 PALT_ACTUAL = 1.000 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 22 19.683 12 14.317 34 
2 17 20.943 23 19.057 40 
3 20 18.313 18 19.687 38 
4 17 15.991 19 20.009 36 
5 10 16.286 30 23.714 40 
6 17 14.323 21 23.677 38 
7 14 13.845 25 25.155 39 
8 14 10.341 17 20.659 31 
9 12 10.715 24 25.285 36 
10 2 4.561 16 13.439 18 
175 
Variables in the Equation 






FEAR .050 .014 11.996 1 .001 1.051 1.022 1.082 
Constant -.630 .300 4.419 1 .036 .533   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEAR. 
 









1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: SSMA 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .059a .003 .001 6.65306 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 53.021 1 53.021 1.198 .275b 
Residual 15403.596 348 44.263   
Total 15456.617 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: SSMA 
176 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 34.050 .969  35.123 .000 
FEAR -.050 .046 -.059 -1.094 .275 
 
a. Dependent Variable: SSMA 
 
Logistic Regression FEAR HI/LO to LPTA Appropriateness 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 133 38.0 
Missing Cases 217 62.0 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 
number of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
Low 0 
High 1 










LPTA Appropriateness Percentage 
Correct Low High 
Step 0 LPTA 
Inappropriateness 
Low 120 0 100.0 
High 13 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.2 
 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.223 .292 57.939 1 .000 .108 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR_LPTA_USE
D 
6.861 1 .009 
Overall Statistics 6.861 1 .009 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 6.559 1 .010 
Block 6.559 1 .010 










1 78.587a .048 .102 
 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 







e Correct Low High 
Step 1 LPTA 
Inappropriateness 
Low 120 0 100.0 
High 13 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.2 
 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
FEAR_LPTA_USED 1.542 .632 5.956 1 .015 4.673 
Constant -3.008 .512 34.493 1 .000 .049 
 
 
Logistic Regression FEAR HI/LO to T/O Appropriateness 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 174 49.7 
Missing Cases 176 50.3 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 
number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
Appropriate 0 
Not Appropriate 1 
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Appropriate 164 0 100.0 
Not 
Appropriate 
10 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   94.3 
 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.797 .326 73.751 1 .000 .061 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR_BINARY_T
O 
1.835 1 .176 
Overall Statistics 1.835 1 .176 
 




Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.786 1 .181 
Block 1.786 1 .181 












1 74.758a .010 .029 
 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 .000 0 . 
 
 






Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 101 101.000 4 4.000 105 














Appropriate 164 0 100.0 
Not 
Appropriate 
10 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   94.3 
 




Variables in the Equation 






FEAR_BINARY_TO -.877 .665 1.740 1 .187 .416 .113 1.531 
Constant -
2.351 
.427 30.289 1 .000 .095   
 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEAR_BINARY_TO. 
 








1 HIGH_FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: DISAT_DISC 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .111a .012 .010 1.710 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 12.781 1 12.781 4.370 .037b 
Residual 1017.779 348 2.925   
Total 1030.560 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: DISAT_DISC 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.087 .130  23.740 .000 
HIGH_FEAR .382 .183 .111 2.091 .037 
 
a. Dependent Variable: DISAT_DISC 
 








1 HIGH_FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: if there was no ability to protest 
question 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .316a .100 .097 1.93920 
 





Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 145.309 1 145.309 38.641 .000b 
Residual 1308.659 348 3.761   
Total 1453.969 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: if there was no ability to protest question 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.723 .147  18.466 .000 
HIGH_FEAR 1.289 .207 .316 6.216 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: if there was no ability to protest question 
 
 




Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 350 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 
number of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 

















Correct No Yes 
Step 0 Discussions No 0 147 .0 
Yes 0 203 100.0 
Overall Percentage   58.0 
 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .323 .108 8.883 1 .003 1.381 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR 4.356 1 .037 








Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 4.370 1 .037 
Block 4.370 1 .037 










1 471.834a .012 .017 
 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 








Correct No Yes 
Step 1 Discussions No 17 130 11.6 
Yes 17 186 91.6 
Overall Percentage   58.0 
 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a FEAR .029 .014 4.315 1 .038 1.030 
Constant -.251 .295 .722 1 .396 .778 
 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEAR. 
 









1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: ORAL_PRESENTATIONS 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .060a .004 .001 2.09783 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.587 1 5.587 1.269 .261b 
Residual 1531.510 348 4.401   
Total 1537.097 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: ORAL_PRESENTATIONS 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 5.023 .306  16.433 .000 
FEAR -.016 .014 -.060 -1.127 .261 
 
a. Dependent Variable: ORAL_PRESENTATIONS 
 








1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: 
NUMBER_OF_PEOPLE_ON_SS 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .277a .077 .074 .28028 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.280 1 2.280 29.022 .000b 
Residual 27.338 348 .079   
Total 29.618 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: NUMBER_OF_PEOPLE_ON_SS 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .632 .041  15.476 .000 
FEAR .010 .002 .277 5.387 .000 
 
 









1 HIGH_FEARb . Enter 
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a. Dependent Variable: 
NUMBER_OF_PEOPLE_ON_SS 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .257a .066 .063 .28197 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.949 1 1.949 24.513 .000b 
Residual 27.669 348 .080   
Total 29.618 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: NUMBER_OF_PEOPLE_ON_SS 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .761 .021  35.509 .000 
HIGH_FEAR .149 .030 .257 4.951 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: NUMBER_OF_PEOPLE_ON_SS 
 
 




Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 350 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 
number of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 















Correct 0 1 
Step 0 RESOURCES 0 240 0 100.0 
1 110 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   68.6 
 
a. Constant is included in the model. 




Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.780 .115 45.909 1 .000 .458 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR .774 1 .379 








Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step .776 1 .378 
Block .776 1 .378 











1 434.965a .002 .003 
 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 




Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
RESOURCES = 0 RESOURCES = 1 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 28 24.577 6 9.423 34 
2 27 28.440 13 11.560 40 
3 29 26.675 9 11.325 38 
4 23 24.970 13 11.030 36 
5 25 27.406 15 12.594 40 
6 21 25.763 17 12.237 38 
7 23 26.230 16 12.770 39 
8 25 20.680 6 10.320 31 
9 26 23.663 10 12.337 36 








Correct 0 1 
Step 1 RESOURCES 0 240 0 100.0 
1 110 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   68.6 
 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 






FEAR .013 .015 .773 1 .379 1.013 .984 1.043 
Constant -1.040 .319 10.608 1 .001 .353   
 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEAR. 
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Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .318a .101 .099 .32938 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.246 1 4.246 39.135 .000b 
Residual 37.755 348 .108   
Total 42.001 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.080 .048  22.505 .000 
FEAR .014 .002 .318 6.256 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI 
 
 








1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI4 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .290a .084 .082 .58979 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11.147 1 11.147 32.045 .000b 
Residual 121.051 348 .348   
Total 132.198 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI4 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.110 .086  12.918 .000 
FEAR .023 .004 .290 5.661 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI4 
 








1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI5 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .280a .078 .076 .75232 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 16.707 1 16.707 29.519 .000b 
Residual 196.964 348 .566   
Total 213.672 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI5 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .729 .110  6.651 .000 
FEAR .028 .005 .280 5.433 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI5 
 
 








1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI9 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .195a .038 .035 .77260 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8.221 1 8.221 13.772 .000b 
Residual 207.727 348 .597   
Total 215.948 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI9 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .490 .113  4.350 .000 
FEAR .020 .005 .195 3.711 .000 
 










1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI10 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .196a .039 .036 .69098 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.665 1 6.665 13.959 .000b 
Residual 166.154 348 .477   
Total 172.819 349    
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a. Dependent Variable: TCI10 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .760 .101  7.548 .000 
FEAR .018 .005 .196 3.736 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TCI10 
 
 









1 Fear N=270b . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Transaction Cost Using Sqrt 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .143a .021 .017 .45284 
 











Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.155 1 1.155 5.631 .018b 
Residual 54.957 268 .205   
Total 56.112 269    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Transaction Cost Using Sqrt 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.993 .078  63.838 .000 
Fear N=270 .009 .004 .143 2.373 .018 
 




Logistic Regression FEAT to AC 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 350 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 350 100.0 
 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 





Dependent Variable Encoding 











Binary...if more were 
awarded Percentage 
Correct 0 1 
Step 0 Binary...if more 
were awarded 
0 331 0 100.0 
1 19 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   94.6 
 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -2.858 .236 146.737 1 .000 .057 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FEAR .863 1 .353 








Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step .872 1 .350 
Block .872 1 .350 










1 146.790a .002 .007 
 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 3.247 8 .918 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
Binary...if more were 
awarded = 0 
Binary...if more were 
awarded = 1 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 33 32.751 1 1.249 34 
2 38 38.338 2 1.662 40 
3 37 36.270 1 1.730 38 
4 34 34.220 2 1.780 36 
5 36 37.853 4 2.147 40 
6 36 35.816 2 2.184 38 
7 38 36.641 1 2.359 39 
8 29 29.027 2 1.973 31 
9 33 33.493 3 2.507 36 






Binary...if more were 
awarded Percentage 
Correct 0 1 
Step 1 Binary...if more 
were awarded 
0 331 0 100.0 
1 19 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   94.6 
 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 






FEAR .029 .031 .857 1 .355 1.029 .968 1.094 
Constant -3.445 .699 24.276 1 .000 .032   
 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: FEAR. 
 
 









1 FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contracting officer Authority 







Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .090a .008 .005 6.005 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 102.573 1 102.573 2.844 .093b 
Residual 12550.696 348 36.065   
Total 12653.269 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contracting officer Authority 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 26.419 .875  30.190 .000 
FEAR -.070 .041 -.090 -1.686 .093 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contracting officer Authority 
 
 








1 HIGH_FEARb . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contracting officer Authority 





Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .006a .000 -.003 6.030 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .424 1 .424 .012 .914b 
Residual 12652.844 348 36.359   
Total 12653.269 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contracting officer Authority 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 25.081 .458  54.709 .000 
HIGH_FEAR -.070 .645 -.006 -.108 .914 
 
























a. Dependent Variable: Contractor Performance 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .350a .123 .118 7.671 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Source Selection Method 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2854.174 2 1427.087 24.255 .000b 
Residual 20416.423 347 58.837   
Total 23270.597 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contractor Performance 


















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 17.765 2.245  7.912 .000 
Tech Eval 
Effectiveness 





.328 .064 .268 5.140 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Contractor Performance 
 















a. Dependent Variable: CP 






Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .222a .049 .042 7.84804 
 









Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 419.203 1 419.203 6.806 .010b 
Residual 8068.526 131 61.592   
Total 8487.729 132    
 
a. Dependent Variable: CP 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 33.819 .766  44.156 .000 
LPTA 
Appropriateness 
(4 or less) when 
LPTA used 
-4.355 1.669 -.222 -2.609 .010 
 















a. Dependent Variable: CP 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .238a .057 .049 7.81857 
 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 479.698 1 479.698 7.847 .006b 
Residual 8008.032 131 61.130   
Total 8487.729 132    
 
a. Dependent Variable: CP 








t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 25.794 2.626  9.821 .000 
LPTA_Appropriateness 1.237 .442 .238 2.801 .006 
 
a. Dependent Variable: CP 













a. Dependent Variable: BS 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .665a .442 .441 2.61931 
 







Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1893.312 1 1893.312 275.962 .000b 
Residual 2387.546 348 6.861   
Total 4280.857 349    
 
a. Dependent Variable: BS 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6.506 .585  11.121 .000 
Contractor 
Performance 
.285 .017 .665 16.612 .000 
 
a. Dependent Variable: BS 
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